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REGULATION A: SMALL BUSINESSES' SEARCH
FOR "A MODERATE CAPITALt
BY RUTHEFORD B CAMPBELL, JR.*
ABSTRACT

Small businesses are an importantpart of our nationaleconomy,
accountingfor as much as 40% of our total economic activity and providing society with importantservices and products.
Small businesses face daunting economic, structural, and legal
impediments when they attempt to acquire external capital. The absence
offinancial intermediationservices means that they are almost always on
their own to find investors. Their small capitalneeds mean that theirrelative offering costs are often sky high. Federaland state securities rules
significantly exacerbate these economic and structuraldisadvantages by
imposingonerous and unwarrantedconditions on theirsearchfor external
capital.
While, initially, one may view these rules as a matter of unfairness
to small entrepreneurs, more broadly, and perhaps more importantly,
society is a loser when small businesses are denied the right to compete
fairlyfor capital.
RegulationA appearson itsface to offer small businesses a way out
of this dilemma. It provides an exemption from the registrationrequirements of the Securities Act of 1933 for small issuers who offer their
securities publicly. The exemption is conditioned upon the issuer's
disclosure to investors of prescribedinvestment information.
RegulationA, however, is almostnever used by small entrepreneurs,
even though it is the only federalexemption generally availablethatallows
a broad,efficient searchfor investors.
The SEC and state securities regulators are to blame for the
impotency of Regulation A. For theirpart, the SEC seems never to have
understood small businesses, their capital needs, their importance to our
economy, and the special circumstances they face when they attempt to
access external capital. States, on their side, seem always to resist
attempts to formulate exemptions that allow small issuers to searchwidely

t"He was not of a mercenary spirit, but he had an immense desire for success, and he
had more than once reflected that a moderate capital was an aid to achievement." HENRY JAMES,
THE BOSTONIANS 15 (Vintage Books 1985) (original publication date 1886).
*Alumni Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A. 1966, Centre
College; J.D. 1969, University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1971, Harvard University.

HeinOnline -- 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 77 2006

DELAWARE JouRNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 31

and efficiently for capital.
The irony is that the Commission's current iteration of Regulation
A provides a framework upon which to construct a sensible and appropriate exemption for public offerings by small issuers. The Commission
has the power to transformRegulation A from its presentfallow state into
a useable tool thatpromotesefficient capitalformationby small businesses
and appropriatelyprotects investors.
In this article the authoroffers data demonstrating the non-use of
Regulation A and makes the casefor a revision of Regulation A. His data
show the importance of small businesses to the national economy, small
businesses' needfor external capitalandthe underuseof RegulationA. He
explains the economic, structural and legal impediments that small
businessesface in their capitalformationand the reasons why Regulation
A is so underutilizedtoday. The authorconcludesby expressingfaith in the
fundamental theory of RegulationA and explaining steps the Commission
could take to take to make RegulationA an effective toolfor small business
capitalformation, benefitting both small entrepreneursand society.
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I. INTRODUCTION

America's small business owners and potential entrepreneurs
often have the ideas, the energy, and the willingness to work
hard, but face an almost insurmountable challenge in finding
the capital they need.... Financing can be especially costly
or more difficult for small firms to find.'
Regulation A2 provides an exemption from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933' for small issuers who offer their

'U.S. SMALL BusINEsS ADMINISTRATION, THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESs: A REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT 1998, at 4 (1999) [hereinafter THE STATE OF SMALL BUsINESs 1998].
2

Regulation A, 17 C.F.R §§ 230.251-230.263 (2005), was enacted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission under the authority of Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C.A. § 77c(b) (West 2005).
'15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77bbbb (West 2005).
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securities publicly. The exemption is conditioned upon the issuer's
disclosure to investors of investment information prescribed by Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commission) rules.4 Regulation
A permits the issuer to solicit widely for investors, imposes no offereepurchaser qualification or suitability requirements, and permits unlimited
resales by persons acquiring shares in a Regulation A offering.
This brief description might suggest that the exemption provided by
Regulation A is not only philosophically sound5 but also popular with small
companies searching for capital. One might anticipate that the Commission, in crafting the disclosures that are a predicate for the availability of
the Regulation A exemption, carefully and expertly strikes a balance
between reasonable protection of investors and capital formation.6 Further,
one might expect the Commission constantly to monitor the workings of the
exemption, adjusting the disclosure and other requirements of the
exemption to ensure a full and appropriate use of the exemption by small
issuers. From the issuers' point of view, one might expect small entrepreneurs to flock to an exemption that has as its only significant condition
of availability the disclosure of closely crafted, reasonable amounts of
clearly described investment information, especially considering the fact
that in most cases Regulation A is the only exemption from registration that
permits small businesses to engage in efficient, broad searches for capital.7
Regulation A, however, has fallen into nearly total disuse.8 Contrary
to the picture just suggested, the empirical data in Part II of this article
demonstrate that the exemption has never reached its potential and, indeed,
reveal that today small businesses almost never rely on Regulation A for
capital formation.
The SEC and state securities regulators are to blame for the utter
failure of Regulation A. For its part, the SEC seems never to have
understood small businesses, their capital needs, their importance to our
economy, and the special circumstances they face when they attempt to
4

See infra Part IV.B.4.
The Securities Act of 1933 is based on a disclosure principle. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 77e (West 2005) (requiring registration and accompanying disclosure for public sales of
5

securities).

6

See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(b) (West 2005) (obligating the Commission in its rulemaking

to "consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation").
7
Except for the intrastate exemption, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(a)(1 1) (West 2005), and Rule
147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2005), Regulation A is the only broadly available exemption the
permits a public solicitation of investors. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. The exemptions provided by § 77c(a)(1 1) and Rule 147, however, are available only if the issuer and all
offerees and purchasers are in the same state. See id.
8
See infra Part II.
HeinOnline -- 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 80 2006
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access external capital; as a corollary, the SEC has never seemed interested
or able to craft Regulation A into a functional exemption for small
businesses. State regulators, on their side, have a long history of actions
that are deleterious to the legitimate capital formation needs of small
issuers. State regulators generally have resisted attempts to formulate
exemptions that allow small issuers to make unregistered public offerings9
and have fought to protect their turf from any federally initiated intrusion.°
The failure by regulators to provide a workable Regulation A
exemption may be considered in terms of its unfairness to small
entrepreneurs, who are unable to access external capital in a cost effective
way. More broadly, and perhaps more importantly, society and the
economy suffer when small businesses are denied a way to compete fairly
for external capital.
Society needs small businesses. They are vital to our national
economy, both qualitatively and quantitatively. They account for as much
as 40% of our total economic activity and provide consumers with many of
the services and products that are essential in our day-to-day lives."
Small businesses, however, cannot compete effectively in their
product markets without access to competitively priced, external capital.
Even without the added burden of regulatory oppression, small businesses
face daunting economic and structural conditions when they enter the
capital markets. External capital for them is hard to find and expensive to
acquire. The absence of financial intermediation services for small
businesses means that they are almost always on their own to find
investors; their small capital needs mean that their relative offering costs
are often sky high.
By practically denying small companies access to a workable
Regulation A, the SEC and state regulators have exacerbated the structural
and economic disadvantages that small businesses encounter in their search
for external capital. Society and the national economy are the losers in all
this.
The irony here is that the Commission's current iteration of
Regulation A provides a sound framework upon which to construct a

9
See, e.g., Mark A. Sargent, A FutureforBlueSky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 471,477-79
(1993). See also Marc I. Steinberg, The Emergence ofState SecuritiesLaws: PartlySunny Skies

for Investors, 62 CIN. L. REv. 395, 408-11 (1993) (describing the resistence of state securities
administrators to changes in Regulation A).
'°See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Impact ofNSMIA on Small Issuers, 53 Bus. LAw.

575, 582-85 (1998) (offering a public choice analysis for the actions of state securities
administrators and others in connection with the enactment of the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996).
"See infra Part IIl.A.
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sensible and appropriate exemption for public offerings by small issuers.
With attention from the Commission, Regulation A can be transformed
from its present, fallow state into a useable tool that promotes efficient
capital formation by small businesses.
The purpose of this article is to present the case for a revision of
Regulation A and to suggest steps the SEC should take in order to transform Regulation A into a workable, sound and balanced exemption
available for small businesses as they search for external capital.
Part II of this article offers data that show that Regulation A is
essentially unused in recent times. Part I presents data demonstrating the
importance of small businesses to our economy and describes the
impediments-both structural and regulatory-small businesses encounter
when they enter the capital market. Part IV focuses on today's iteration of
Regulation A and the state securities laws applicable to Regulation A
offerings. The discussion demonstrates that together Regulation A and
state securities laws amount to an unwarranted regulatory burden, which
contributes significantly to the underuse of Regulation A. Finally, in Part
V, the article proposes that Regulation A be refocused on offerings by truly
small businesses and proposes revisions to Regulation A and state blue sky
laws necessary to transform Regulation A into an efficient regime for small
business capital formation.
II. THE NON-USE OF REGULATION A

Data show that small businesses almost never utilize Regulation A
as a way to raise external capital.1 2 The last year the SEC collected and
reported data on Regulation A filings, which was calendar year 1988, only
seventy Regulation A offerings were filed with the Commission.' 3 Taking

2

Commentators uniformly recognize the under-use of Regulation A. See, e.g., SEC,
Final Report: 2002 Conference on Federal-State Securities Regulation, available at
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/ffedst20O2.htm (last visited July 19, 2005) (participants, who
included state and federal regulators, "noted that the Regulation A exemption appears to be
underused"); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 203 (4th ed. 2002)

("Regulation A has been used relatively infrequently when compared to the exemptions from
registration available under Regulation D.").
1348 SEC MONTHLY STAT. Rv. 15 (Feb. 1989). An Explanatory Note states:
Generally excluded from the series are: debt securities with maturities of less
than one year; secondary offerings; non-cash offerings; issues exempt under
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933; domestic government securities;
offerings of non-profit and/or charitable groups; securities offered only on an
intrastate basis; employee stock plans; open-end investment company issues;
intracorporate securities transactions and sales to foreign purchasers. Issues
registered for offering and later withdrawn are excluded from these offerings
data.
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a longer view, from 1981 through 1988 inclusive, the
Commission reported
4
annually.'
fillings
A
Regulation
140
of
an average
Since 1988, data and reports show that Regulation A as continued to
be rarely used by small issuers. For example, a footnote to a Securities Act
Release suggests that the Commission received a total of only 177
Regulation A filings during the three year period from 1989-1992. "
More current information about Regulation A filings is available on
the Commission's EDGAR system and provides evidence of an even further
decline in the use of Regulation A. A search of the EDGAR system reveals
that during the ten year period from 1995 through 2004, a total of only
seventy-eight Form 1-A's were filed with the Commission. 6 This amounts,
on average, to only about eight Regulation A filings per year. 7
These data dramatically demonstrate that Regulation A is essentially
unused by small businesses. The data become even more powerful when
interpreted in light of the discussion in Part 1H of this article, which
suggests that hundreds of thousands of small businesses were in search of
external capital during these years.
III. THE CASE FOR A REVISED REGULATION A
Many feel that Regulation A has outlived its
usefulness, that the Commission's most prudent course of
action is simply to preside over its orderly demise. I do not

Id. at 23.

4

1 For

1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988, the Commission reported 97, 112, 119, and 70

Regulation A filings, respectively. 48 SEC MONTHLY STAT. REV. 15 (Feb. 1989). For 1982,

1983, and 1984, the Commission reported 189, 127, and 95 Regulation A filings, respectively.
44 SEC MONTHLY STAT. REV. 13 (Mar. 1985). For 1981, the Commission reported 314
Regulation A filings. 44 SEC MONTHLY STAT. REV. 14 (Feb. 1985). For a more comprehensive
view of the use of Regulation A, see J. WILuAM HIcKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE

SECURmES Acr OF 1933 § 6.3, tbls. 2, 2.1 (2001) (providing data on the use of Regulation A for
most years from 1947 through 1988).
"Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 33-6949,57 Fed. Reg. 36,442
(Aug. 13, 1992) ("In the past three years, only 6 of the 177 Regulation A filings made with the
Commission were pursuant to the terms of Rule 257.").
16Search of Historical SEC Edgar Archives, availableat http://www.sec.gov/cgi-binl
srch-edgar?text=l-a&first=1994&last=2005&mode=Simple (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
"One way to evaluate these data is by reference to the number of registered offerings
the Commission processed during the same period. During 1988, for example, the Commission
reported that issuers filed 3,860 registration statements. 48 SEC MONTHLY STAT. REV. 15 (Feb.
1989). Over the eight year period from 1981 through 1988, the Commission reported an annual
average of 3,334 registered offerings. See 44 SEC MONTHLY STAT. REV. 14 (Feb. 1985); 44 SEC
MONTHLY STAT. REV. 13 (Mar. 1985); 48 SEC MONTHLY STAT. REV. 15 (Feb. 1989).
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I shall not easily preside over its burial.18

The compelling case for a revised Regulation A is based on three
simple and apparent facts. First, small businesses are very important to our
national economy. Second, in order to compete and generate efficiencies,
small businesses need (and deserve) a fair shot at acquiring external capital
under conditions that are competitive. Finally, under today's combined
state and federal securities regimes, small businesses are unable to conduct
efficient searches for external capital.
A. The Importance of Small Businesses
Small businesses are an important part of our national economy.
However one looks at the matter-whether in terms of the number or
percentage of business units, the types of goods and services provided,
employment or innovation-small businesses are significant in our
everyday lives and vital to the economy of our nation.
Perhaps better than any other source, data compiled by the Small
Business Administration (SBA data)' 9 show the economic importance of
small businesses.20 These data show, for example, that there are about five
million businesses in the United States that employ fewer than twenty

"8Address by Roderick M. Hills, A Report from the SEC, before the Securities Indus.
Assoc. Ann. Convention, Boca Raton, Fla., [1975-1976 TransferBinderl Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
180,339, at 85,888 (Dec. 5, 1975).
19

See, e.g., U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS:
A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 2000 (2001) [hereinafter THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000].

In a previous article, the author used SBA data from U.S. SMALLBuSINESS ADMINISTRATION, THE
STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1994 (1995) [hereinafter THE STATE
OF SMALL BUSINESS 1994]. Campbell, supra note 10, at 575-77. Similar data from the 1994
Report and the 2000 Report do not differ materially, although they show, for example, a slight

increase in the number of small businesses with twenty or less employees and a slight decrease
in the percentage of total employment by such firms. Data from later SBA Reports are also
generally consistent with these prior data and are utilized in this article. See, e.g., infra note 21
(utilizing data from 2004 THE SMA.L BUSINESS ECONOMY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (2004)
[hereinafter THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY].
2
Data demonstrating the significance of small business to our economy can also be
found in U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1999(119th ed

1999). Particularly relevant to this article and supportive of the SBA data are the data found at
id. tbl. 861, at 545 (84.6% of all business tax returns filed for 1980 were filed by entities with less
than $1 million in receipts; 7.4% of all business receipts during that year were generated by

entities with less than $1 million in receipts), and at id. tbl. 874, at 555 (in 1980, 22.3% of total
national payroll came from firms with less than twenty employees, and 47.5% of total national

payroll that year came from firms with less than 100 employees).
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employees. 21 Firms in this smallest of size categories-less than twenty
employees-account, therefore, for almost 90% of the total business units
in the United States.22 Continuing to focus on absolute numbers of small
businesses, the SBA data report about five and one-half million business
firms have less than 100 employees. Thus, this somewhat larger version of
a small firm accounts for slightly over 98% of the total businesses units in
the United States.23
Another, perhaps even more revealing, measure of the importance of
small businesses is employment. Here one finds that the smallest firms,
those with less than twenty employees, provide nearly 18% of all the jobs
in the United States,24 while firms with less than 100 workers provide
approximately 36% of all jobs.25 In absolute numbers, firms employing less
than twenty employees provide work for slightly more than twenty million
people, 26 and all firms employing less than 100 workers provide
employment for nearly forty-one million people.27
Small businesses also provide dynamic energy for our economy that
is not properly impounded in the foregoing data.28 Small entrepreneurs
21

THE SMALLBUSINESS ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 178 tbl. A-5 (in 2001, 5,036,845

firms in America had less than twenty employees). In 1998,4,988,367 firms in America had less
than twenty employees. THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 19, at 61 tbl. A.4.
22
See THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 178 tbl. A-5 (in 2001, 89.0%
of all firms in America had less than twenty employees); see also THE STATE OFSMALLBUSINESS
2000, supra note 19, at 61 tbl. A.4.
23
See THE SMALL BusINESs ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 178 tbl. A-5 (in 2001,
5,555,103 firms, which is 98.2% of all firms in America, employed less than 100 persons); see
also THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 19, at 61 tbl. A.4.
24
See THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 178 tbl. A-5 (in 2001, firms
with less than twenty employees provided work for 17.9% of all workers employed in the United
States). In 1998, firms with less than twenty employees provided work for 18.8% of all workers
in the United States. THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 19, at 61 tbl. A.4.
25
See THE SMALLBUSINESS ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 178 tbl. A-5 (in 2001, firms
with less than 100 employees provided work for 35.6% of all workers employed in the United
States). In 1998, firms with less than 100 employees provided work for 36.7% of all workers in
the United States. THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 19, at 61 tbl. A.4.
26
See THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 178 tbl. A-5 (in 2001, firms
with less than twenty employees provided jobs for 20,602,635 workers). In 1998, firms with less
than twenty employees provided jobs for 20,275,405 workers. THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS
2000, supra note 19, at 61 tbl. A.4.
27
See THE SMALLBUSINESS ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 178 tbl. A-5 (in 2001, firms
with less than 100 employees provided jobs for 40,973,082 workers). In 1998, firms with less
than 100 employees providedjobs for 39,653,019 workers. THE STATEOFSMALLBuSINESS 2000,
supra note 19, at 61 tbl. A.4.
28
SBA data show, for example, that during 1996-1997, 95.5% of all firm births
involved firms with less than twenty employees, and 99.9% of all firm failures were of firms with
less than twenty employees Id. at 84 tbl. A.9 (during 1996-1997, 564,197 of the total of 590,644
firm births involved firms with less than twenty employees, while 500,014 of the 500,536 firm
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appear to generate a disproportionately large amount of job creation,
opportunities for historically disadvantaged groups and innovation. In
short, they provide much of the entrepreneurial spirit that drives our market
economy.
In the area of job creation, small businesses are vital. Various
statements regarding the percentage ofjobs created by small businesses put
the percentage as high as 75%. SBA data, for example, show that in a
recent two year period, 50.2% of all new jobs were created by firms of less
than twenty employees.29
SBA data also show the increases in women-owned and minorityowned firms.30 Not surprising, the SBA states that "[s]mall business
continued to be an important means by which women, minorities, and
mainstream and managed to
immigrants entered the American economic
1
economy.'
the
in
share
their
increase
Finally, although hard data regarding innovation are difficult to find,
both estimates and opinions suggest the importance of small businesses to
innovation. By one estimate, for example, small firms generate 55% of all
manufacturing product innovations and more than twice the innovations per
employee as large firms.32 In his report to Congress on small business,
President Bill Clinton referred to the "key role" of new and small firms "in
the experimentation and innovation that leads to technological change and
economic growth. They are continual sources of new ideas.., and their
an essential part of the organic and ever-changing
experimental efforts are
33
American economy.
B. The Importance of External Capitalfor Small Businesses
Data confirm that small businesses need external capital and that
their need for external capital increases as they grow in size. Data show
that slightly over 85% of firms with ten to nineteen employees utilize some
form of credit as a source of financing.34 That number increases to slightly

deaths involved firms with less than twenty employees). Although one must exercise care in using
these numbers, certainly they show the dynamic nature of the investment and disinvestment by
small entrepreneurs. The data show that small entrepreneurs are risk takers, willing to invest in
new enterprises, services, and products,
29

TmE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 19, at 84 tbl. A.9.

3

Id. at 102 tbl. A.14.
"1d. at 17.
32THE STATE OF SMALL BusINESS 1994, supra note 19, at 15.
33
THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1998, supra note 1, at 3.
34THESTATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1994, supra note 19, at 167 tbl. 5.15.
3

HeinOnline -- 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 86 2006

2006]

REGULATION A: SMALL BusINEssEs' SEARCH

over 90% for firms employing between twenty and ninety-nine persons.3 5
Refocusing on traditional loans only, data suggest that about 75% of firms
employing ten to nineteen persons and around 80% of all firms employing
between twenty and ninety-nine persons rely on traditional loans as a form
6
3

of financing.

Financial institutions are a major source of debt capital utilized by
small businesses. SBA data show that about 55% of firms with ten to
nineteen employees finance through loans from financial depository
institutions. The number goes to around 70% for firms with twenty to
ninety-nine employees.37 Although somewhat less important, nondepository financial institutions, such as finance companies, provide
financing to approximately 35% of small firms with between ten and
nineteen employees and nearly the same percentage of all firms with
between twenty and ninety-nine employees.38
Economic efficiency provides an explanation for small businesses'
reliance on institutional credit. Depository institutions, for example, are
able to amass capital relatively easily from deposits and other sources.
Financial institutions are also efficient in evaluating and diversifying risk
as well as pricing the capital they lend to small businesses. They are
engaged in multiple, repeat transactions and as a result are experienced and
efficient in credit analysis.
Financial institutions, however, are normally limited in the type of
capital they are able or willing to supply small businesses. Regulatory
limitations explain part of this problem. Banks, for example, are typically
39
foreclosed from making equity investments in their business customers

35

1d. (in 1993, for example, 88.7% of firms with ten to nineteen employees and 9 1.1%
of firms employing between twenty and ninety-nine persons utilized some form of credit as a
source of financing).
36
1d. (in 1993,75.5% of firms employing ten to nineteen persons and 81.4% of all firms
employing between twenty and ninety-nine persons relied on traditional loans as a form of
financing).
37Id. at 176 tbl. 5.15 (in 1993, 57.4% of firms employing ten to nineteen persons and
70.7% of all firms employing between twenty and ninety-nine persons relied on loans from
depository institutions).
38
THE STATEOFSMALLBUSINESS 1994, supra note 19, at 167 tbl. 5.15 (in 1993,35.5%
of firms employing ten to nineteen persons and 34.5% of all firms employing between twenty and
ninety-nine persons relied on loans from non-depository institutions).
39
For example, the Glass-Steagall Act limits national banks and Federal Reservemember state banks "to purchasing and selling ... securities and stock without recourse, solely
upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account," except
"under such limitations and restrictions" as the comptroller may prescribe. 12 U.S.C.A. § 24
(West 2005).
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40
and are limited as to the size of a loan they can make to a single customer.
In addition to such regulatory limitations, the culture of banking and
perceptions about what amounts to sound banking practices limit
significantly the kind of loans that banks are prepared to make to small
businesses. For example, banks usually require collateral that is more than
sufficient to liquidate the loan in the event of default and, in the case of
loans to corporations, require an equity cushion supporting their loan. Such
rules, often imposed as a matter of sound business practices, limit the types
of business loans that banks are willing and able to make.
The normal progression for a growing small business, therefore, is
to exhaust its line of institutional credit and then to seek other sources of
external capital. It is here where small businesses encounter some of their
most challenging problems.

C. Impediments to Small Businesses' Efficient Search
for External Capital
1. Structural and Economic Impediments
Small businesses' difficulties in finding external capital are not
caused by a supply inadequacy. There are billions of dollars available in
the broad capital market for nearly any risk/reward combination.4 The
problems for small businesses are, instead, the difficulties they face in
identifying potential investors and the costs of connecting themselves with
the investors' demand. In short, it is the ubiquitous problem of transaction
costs.
Two related circumstances are important in that regard. First,
financial intermediation is unavailable to small businesses. Second, their

40A national bank may lend up to 15% of its unimpaired capital and surplus to a single
borrower. 12 U.S.C.A. § 84(a)(1) (West 2005). An additional 10% may be lent, if the loan is
secured by "readily marketable collateral having a market value, as determined by reliable and
continuously available price quotations." Id. § 84(a)(2); see also 12 C.F.R. § 32.2(n) (2005)

(providing an expansive definition of "readily marketable collateral"). For an extensive discussion
of the exceptions, qualifications, and the penalties for noncompliance with 12 U.S.C.A. § 84(a),
see 1MILTON R. SCHROEDER, THE LAW AND REGULATION OFFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 7.04 (6th

ed. 2005).

4

'Consider, for example, the data prepared by Ibbotson, which track historical returns
on various categories of investments from risk free government obligations through small cap
companies. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
146 tbl. 7-1 (5th ed. 1996) (average rates of return on various broad types of investments, 19261994).
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relative offering costs are very high.42
Reputable, competent underwriting services are not available for
offerings by small businesses. The simple reason is that the proceeds from
small offerings cannot support the expenses encountered by an
underwriting firm, who must learn the company, evaluate the deal, sell the
deal, and absorb the residual risk of liability that is generated by the
offering, and ultimately earn a reasonable return on its capital. 3
Professors Gilson and Kraakman have described the value of
financial intermediation for firms attempting to access external capital.'
Reputable professional underwriters, they observe, provide issuers with the
"sales force and facilities necessary to sell the securities"4 5 and act as "an
information and reputational intermediary."' Further, underwriters reduce
"processing costs," which are "obviously lower for a single investment
banker than for a disparate group of individual buyers,"4 7 and reduce the
investors' "verification costs."48
Small issuers, who are forced to sell their stock without the
assistance of reputable, competent underwriters, therefore, are unable to
capture the transactional efficiencies described by Gilson and Kraakman,49
which drives up their transaction costs. Small businesses do not have
trained personnel who are able to sell their securities in an efficient,
competitive manner. Usually, company employees do not know where to
find potential investors and do not know how to sell them if they are able
42

See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox ETAL., SEcuRiEs REGULATIONCASES AND MATERIALS 149

(4th ed. 2004) (reporting a "recent estimate" for the expenses of an IPO as $150,000-$300,000
in fees to counsel; $100,000-$150,000 for the audit; $10,000-$20,000 for underwriter counsel
expenses... and $50,000-$100,000 for printing costs").
43
For example, if one imagines a small offering of $500,000, a 10% underwriting
spread would generate only $50,000. This is substantially below a fee sufficient to support the
expenses outlined in the text.
"Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanismsof Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549, 613-21 (1984).
45
1d.at 616.
46

1d. at 618.

47

1d. at 619.

48Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 45, at 619.

Professor Langevoort also provides
thoughtful insights into intermediation, especially in the context of small issuers. See, e.g.,
Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promiseof "TechnologicalDisintermediation"for UnregisteredOfferings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 16-18

(1998) (examining "more recent social science-based work outside of conventional economics that
also speaks to the role of intermediation in the capital-raising process").
49

Also important here are the disinvestment difficulties encountered by investors in
small businesses. Since there is no trading market for such shares, their transaction costs when
they seek to sell their stock will be high. Rational investors, therefore, will demand more return

on their investment in small businesses in order to provide compensation for expected high
disinvestment costs.
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to find investors. Also, the company itself is unable to provide investors
with the same level of verification of facts and credible analysis provided
by underwriters. The strong self interest of a company issuing and selling
its own securities makes the investors less willing to rely on the company's
information and analyses and thus requires that each investor underwrite
the expense of its own verification and analysis.
The second, related problem faced by small businesses is that the
other offering expenses are very high. For example, small businesses must
deal with expenses such as accounting and legal expenses. Moreover, one
should appreciate that it is relative, not absolute, offering expenses that are
important. To use an extreme example, $500,000 in offering costs on a
$50 million offering will certainly not kill the transaction, while $500,000
in offering expenses on a $500,000 deal will kill the transaction.
Accounting, legal and other expenses on small deals can easily
exceed $50,000, and such amounts bulk large relative to the total yield from
a small offering. When added to the costs due to the lack of financial
intermediation services, one is able to appreciate the extreme structural and
economic disadvantages that small entrepreneurs encounter when attempting to access external capital.5 °
The disproportionately high transaction costs that small issuers face
when they attempt to access non-institutional capital have important
economic effects on society. Inability of small firms to compete effectively
in the capital market makes small firms less competitive in their product
market. Efficient allocations of productive assets are distorted and in
individual, extreme cases, small firms may expire, even though the small
firm may otherwise be a very efficient producer. In such cases, larger firms
that are less efficient (except for their transaction costs in connection with
capital formation) will replace small firms that are more efficient (except
for their transaction costs in connection with capital formation).
One might imagine that a society concerned with economic
efficiency, fairness, and equal access to business opportunities would move
to enhance the competitive opportunities for small businesses to obtain
external capital. Unfortunately, as the following discussion shows,
society's rules actually exacerbate the structural and economic impediments
faced by small businesses searching for external capital.

"In light of structural and cost issues, one should not be surprised to find a minuscule
number of public offerings by small businesses. Data show, for example, that in 1999, there were
only 101 registered initial public offerings by firms with $10 million in assets or less. THE STATE
OFSMALLBUSINESS 2000, supranote 19, at 27 tbl. 1.10. In 1998, such firms made only sixty-two
IPOs. Id. These data capture the predictable result of the high transaction costs on small businesses' access to capital in the public market.
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2. Regulatory Impediments
This part of the article examines, in only the broadest terms, the rules
society imposes on the capital formation activities of small businesses. The
discussion demonstrates that state and federal regulators have been
insensitive to the high capital formation costs faced by small issuers.
Instead of capital formation rules that reduce the cost disparity between the
capital formation activities of large and small businesses, one finds that
state and federal legal regimes actually make the problem worse, most
importantly by providing no cost efficient way for small businesses to
solicit broadly for their investors.
a.

Society's Broad Rules Respecting CapitalFormation

Under the Securities Act of 1933, an issuer selling its stock must
either register its securities with the SEC or qualify for an exemption from
the federal registration requirements." State blue sky laws impose similar
obligations on issuers.52
The legal obligations imposed by any state respecting capital
formation are independent of the obligations imposed by all other states and
the federal government. Thus, compliance with the securities laws of one
state does not satisfy the issuer's obligations in other states or with the
federal government. Similarly, meeting the issuer's federal obligations does
not ensure that the issuer has met its obligations in any state. Although
these rules apply broadly to small and large businesses alike, the rules
disproportionately and adversely impact capital formation activities of
small businesses.
b.

Registration

Registration has never been a viable way for small businesses to
54
raise capital. 3 High transaction costs associated with registered offerings
inevitably put registration out of the range of small businesses in search of

" 15 U.S.C § 77e (2000).
52See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. ACT § 301, 7C U.L.A. 158 (2000).
53See THE STATE OFSMALLBUSINESS 2000, supra note 19, at 27 tbl. 1.10 (in 1999, out

of the millions of small businesses in the United States, there were only 101 federally registered
offerings by small businesses).
54
See supra note 51.
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capital.55 Thus, the data show that small offerings 6 are very rarely made
through SEC registration.5 7
c.

Exempt Offerings (Except Regulation A)

Historically, the federal exemptions from registration broadly
available to small businesses" have been the intrastate exemption under
Section 3(a)(1 1),59 the private place exemption under Section 4(2),6 and
exemptions for small issuers authorized by Section 3(b). 6' Under each of
these statutory exemptions the Commission has promulgated regulations,

55

If registration were an economically viable alternative for small issuers, it would
produce a number of attractive benefits. It would ameliorate problems of inadvertent loss of an
exemption through the impact of the integration doctrine, see, e.g.,RuthefordB Campbell, Jr., The
Overwhelming Case for Elimination of the Integration Doctrine Under the Securities Act of
1933,89 KY.L.J. 289 (2000-2001) [hereinafter Campbell, The Overwhelming Case] (arguing for
elimination of the integration doctrine) or failure to meet the technical requirements of a particular
exemption. It would eliminate all resale restrictions that often adversely impact the attractiveness
of exemptions. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Resales of Securities Under the Securities Act of
1933, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1333, 1351-75 (1995) [hereinafter Campbell, Resales of
Securities] (describing the restriction of resales of securities taken in exempt transactions).
Finally, it would provide some help and comfort regarding antifraud compliance. Scheduled
disclosure requirements in registration forms provide a prepackaged checklist regarding matters
and events that may be material and thus subject to disclosure obligation under antifraud rules,
such as Rule lOb-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005). Compliance with the registration form,
therefore, effectively reduces the risk of a material omission of fact that would generate liability
under federal antifraud rules.
56
See THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 19, at 27 tbl. 1.10 (reporting
that in 1999 the average size of "small" offerings was $42.4 million). Even going back another
ten years to 1989, the average size of an IPO offering by a small issuer was $6.6 million. Id.
7
It is interesting to look at the number of IPOs by small issuers in relation to the SEC's
adoption of its SB Forms, registration forms designed especially for small businesses. The first
of the SB Forms was adopted by the Commission in Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act
Release No. 6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442 (Aug. 13, 1992). Starting with 1988 and coming through
1991, the SBA reports 83, 89, 86, and 116 IPOs in the respective years. Id. In 1992, the year of
adopting the SB Forms, 171 IPOs were registered by small issuers. Id. In years 1993 through
1996, registered small businesses' IPOs amounted to 203, 202, 193, and 304. Id. In 1997, the
number of IPOs registered by small businesses dropped back to 154. THE STATE OF SMALL
BusiNEss 1998, supra note 1, at 161 tbl. 5.10. "Small businesses" for this data are issuers with
assets of $10 million or less. Id.
58
Other exemptions under the 1933 Act are not broadly available for small businesses.
Examples of more limited exemptions are the exemptions provided for the offer and sale of
governmental securities and bank securities, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(a)(2) (West 2005), and for certain
sales of securities by bank holding companies. Id. § 77c(a)(12).
59
1d. § 77c(a)(11).
60
1d. § 77(d)(2).
6
Id. § 77c(b). The exemptions from registration provided by Rules 504 and 505, 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.504-230.505 (2005), are examples of regulatory exemptions enacted under Section
3(b).
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and both Section 3(a)( 11) and Section 4(2) have generated common law
exemptions.6 2
States generally have had only two types of broadly available
exemptions from their registration requirements.63 First, most states have
some type of a small offering exemption. 6' For example, the Uniform
Securities Act exempts from registration offers to less than ten persons
within a twelve-month period, provided the issuer pays no brokerage fees
in connection with the offer and reasonably believes that the purchasers are
taking for investment.65 Second, states also often have some form of the
Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE),66 which provides for an
exemption from state registration for offers made in compliance with
federal Rules 50567 and 506,68 provided that certain other conditions are
met.69 In 1996, Congress passed the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA),7 ° which preempted part of state control over securities
matters. NSMIA, however, had virtually no impact on state rules governing

62

Section 3(b), on the other hand, is not self-executing and thus requires Commission

rules. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(b) (West 2005).
63
States statutes and regulations provide other exemptions from the state registration
requirements. None, however, is broadly available to small businesses. For example, some
exemptions are limited to certain industries, such as the exemption provided by the Uniform
Securities Act for securities issues by some regulated, financial institutions and some regulated,
non-financial institutions, such as public utilities. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(a), 7C U.L.A. 218-19
(2000). Other exemptions, such as the exemption from registration for shares traded on certain
national securities markets, are available only for securities issued by larger companies. See, e.g.,
id. § 402(a)(8) (exempting from registration shares trades on the New York, American or Midwest
Stock Exchange). For a discussion of the so-called marketplace exemption, see Rutheford B
Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent CongressionalPreemption Failure,22 J. CORP.
LAW 176 (1997).
64See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.203(9) (West 1999); KAN.STAT.ANN. § 17-1262(/)
(Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10502(2)(P)-(Q)(West Supp. 2004); 02-032-525
ME. CODE R. §§ 1-5 (Weil 2003).
65UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7C U.L.A. 220 (2000).
'Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 6201, at 6101 (May
1989). The ULEO was promulgated by the North American Securities Administrators
Association for adoption by state securities' regulators.
6717 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2005).
681d. § 230.506.
'Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 6201, at 6101 (May
1989). Additional requirements imposed by the ULOE include a suitability requirement and a
requirement that non-accredited investors be sophisticated. Id. at 6103. State regulatory agencies,
when they adopt the ULOE for their state, often impose additional or different criteria as a
condition for the available of the exemption. See, e.g., Therese H. Maynard, The Uniform Limited
Offering Exemption: How "Uniform"is "Uniform?"--AnEvaluationand Critiqueof the ULOE,
36 EMORY L.J. 357, 504 (1987) (arguing that ULOE has not provided uniformity among states).
7
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 100
Stat. 3416 (1996).
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capital formation by small businesses."
The following brief discussions are organized around federal
exemptions, but each discussion also explains the impact of state securities
rules on small business capital formation. The discussions show how the
combined effects of state and federal rules governing capital formation
make it even more difficult for small businesses to raise capital and thus
widen significantly the cost disparity between large and small businesses
when they attempt to raise external capital.
1.

Intrastate Offerings

Small businesses may use the federal intrastate exemption provided
by Rule 147 for offering their securities.72 To qualify for the Rule 147
exemption, all offerees and purchasers must be residents of the same state
in which the issuer is incorporated and doing business.73 Resales of
securities taken in a Rule 147 offering are subject to a relatively modest
nine-month holding period.74
On its face, Rule 147 appears attractive to small businesses. The rule
permits small businesses to make broad, intrastate, public solicitations of
investors and to solicit and sell their securities to unsophisticated or nonwealthy investors.75 While the rule does impose some requirements that

71

See Campbell, supra note 10, at 581 (arguing that NSMIA had no impact on small

issuers).
7217

C.F.R. § 230.147 (2005). The Commission enacted Rule 147 under Section

3(a)( 11) of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(a)(1 1) (West 2005). Although Rule 147 is not the
exclusive manner in which an issuer may qualify for an exemption under Section 3(a)(l 1), see 17
C.F.R. § 230.147, Preliminary Note 1 (2005), the common law under that Section is so unsettled
and undeveloped that it does not provide a workable vehicle for the sale of securities. The
Commission's enactment of Rule 147 eliminated these problems to a large degree. See Rutheford
B Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of 1933: Practical
Foreclosurefrom the CapitalMarket, 1977 DUKEL.J. 1139, 1167-72 (describing the advantages
of Rule 147 over the common law of Section 3(a)(l 1)).
7317 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2005). Section 3(a)( 11) provides an exemption from
registration if securities are "offered and sold only to persons resident within... [the state] where
the issuer of such security is... incorporated.., and doing business." 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(a)(1 1)
(West 2005).
74See Campbell, Resales of Securities, supra note 56, at 1351-55.
"'The position of the SEC is that a public advertisement may be used in an intrastate
offering, even if such advertisement reaches an interstate audience, so long as the advertisement
makes it explicitly clear that the offering is limited to residents of the state in which the offering
is being made. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 33-4434, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2270,
at 2609 (Dec. 6, 1961) (stating that offers under Section 3(a)(l 1) "may be made the subject of
general newspaper advertisement [provided the advertisement is appropriately limited to indicate
that offers to purchase are solicited only from, and sales will be made only to, residents of the
particular State involved]"). See also Maryland Inn, SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 SEC No-Act.
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limit its use by small issuers-such as limitations on the issuer's interstate
activities 76 and residency requirements for offerees and purchasers 7 7-the
ability in a Rule 147 offering to solicit broadly for investors without regard
to make the rule
to offeree qualifications would seem in many instances
78
attractive for small businesses in search of capital.
Unfortunately, these benefits of Rule 147 to a small business are
negated by state blue sky laws. As stated above, Congress, when it enacted
NSMIA, did not preempt the applicability of state blue sky laws to
offerings made under the intrastate exemption 79 and, as a result, small
businesses utilizing Rule 147 are subject to state registration requirements.
The only state exemption from registration" that typically is broadly
available for small businesses utilizing Rule 147 is the small offering

LEXIS 97 (Jan. 21, 1976) (noting that newspaper advertisements for a Maryland intrastate
offering did render Rule 147 unavailable even though some of the advertisements were in
newspapers published in states other than Maryland); Master Financial, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,560 (May 27, 1999) (stating the fact
that an out-of-state resident reads or listens to the advertisement for the intrastate offering does
not disqualify the use of Rule 147).
76
Rule 147 requires that 80% of the issuer's revenues be generated by activities
conducted in the same state as is the residence of all offerees and purchasers. Additionally, 80%
of the issuer's assets must be located in, and 80% of the proceeds from the offering must be used
in connection with, the issuer's business within that state. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c) (2005).
"All offerees and purchasers must have their "principal residence" in the same state as
the one in which the issuer is incorporated and doing business. Id. § 230.147(d).
The Rule contains other requirements that make the exemption somewhat less attractive.
For example, interstate resales are prohibited for nine months, although intrastate resales are
permissible during that time period. Id. § 230.147(e). For a discussion of the resale restrictions
under Rule 147, see Campbell, Resales of Securities, supra note 56, at 1351-55. The rule also
has a complicated integration provisions, which make it somewhat less attractive as a vehicle for
capital formation. See Campbell, The Overwhelming Case, supra note 56, at 311-18.
7
Consider the basic example we have used before-that of a small business that needs
to raise a modest $250,000 in equity capital. One could imagine that the CEO of the company
could make a broad, general solicitation of investors within the state through advertisements in
newspapers, trade journals and even the Internet. See supra discussion note 76. Perhaps even
more importantly and realistically, the CEO could develop a list of 100 potential investors and,
inexpensively, pitch the stock to these potential investors. The CEO could do this without regard
to the number or qualifications of the offerees. The sales effort would be limited only by the
requirement that offers and sales be made only to residents of the appropriate state and, of course,
the antifraud provisions of Rule lOb-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005). While this flexibility
certainly cannot completely overcome small businesses' high offering transaction costs, it is a
significant step in the right direction.
7915 U.S.C.A. § 77r (West 2005). NSMIA preempted only with regard to "covered
securities," and securities issued under Rule 147 are not within that definition.
80The ULOE is typically only available to exempt securities issued under Rule 505 and
506. Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 1 6201, at 6101 (May 1989).
For exhaustive and thoughtful discussions of ULOE, see Maynard, supra note 70; Ronald L. Fein
et al., ULOE: Comprehendingthe Confusion, 43 Bus. LAw. 737 (1988); Mark A. Sargent &
Hugh H. Makens, ULOE: New Hope, New Challenge,45 Bus. LAW. 1319 (1990).
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exemption, which imposes severe limitations on the number of offers or
sales the issuer is allowed. 8' State blue sky laws, therefore, effectively
foreclose a broad intrastate solicitation in a Rule 147 offering, thereby
eliminating the most attractive aspect of the Rule for small businesses.
2.

Private Placements under Section 4(2)

Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act provides an exemption from federal
registration for "transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering., 8 2 There is broad agreement that the exemption prohibits any
general advertizing for investors83 and imposes significant resale restriction.84 Most also interpret the exemption as requiring sophisticated offerees
and purchasers 5 who have access to the same information that is contained
in a registration statement.8 6
Again, state blue sky laws apply to Section 4(2) transactions.87
Typically, state requirements are met through the state small offering
exemption, which, as described above, severely limits the number of
offerees or purchasers and forbids any selling commissions.88
In combination, therefore, the conditions for Section 4(2) and state

81

UN1F. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7C U.L.A. 220 (2000). States have some variation in
the terms of their small offering exemption. For example, Kansas uses actual sales, while
Kentucky uses offers to calculate the availability of the exemption. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-1262(/)(1) (Supp. 2004) with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.410(1)(i) (West 2004). The
maximum number of investors also vary somewhat among states. Compare IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 502.203(9) (West 1999) (less than thirty-six purchasers) with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(/)(1)
(Supp. 2004) (not to exceed twenty sales).
8215 U.S.C.A. § 77d(2) (West 2005).
83
See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES
AND MATERIALS 396 (9th ed. 2003) ("The concept of a private offering precludes general
advertising or general solicitation through which offers are made."). This notion goes back to the
very beginning of the 1933 Act itself. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 33-285, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 2740, at 2911-12 (Jan. 24, 1935) (listing among the factors of importance to the
availability of the private placement exemption the manner of offering).
"See Campbell, Resales of Securities, supra note 56, at 1341-46.
5
" See, e.g., the discussion in Cox ET AL., supra note 43, at 395-98 (discussing the issue
of sophistication). The authors observe that "differences of opinion" exist regarding the
sophistication requirement. Id. at 395. They conclude, nonetheless, that issuers who fail to ensure
the quality of their offerees "proceed at their (own] peril." Id. at 396.
86In the seminal case, SEC v. Ralston PurinaCo., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), the Supreme
Court stated that an offering limited to employees who "have access to the same kind of
information ... available in ... a registration statement" may come within the Section 4(2)
exemption. Id. at 125-26.
8
7NSMIA preempted only with regard to "covered securities," and securities issued
under Section 4(2) are not within that definition. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r (West 2005).

8S5ee
supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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blue sky laws make it impossible for small businesses that have exhausted
their institutional line of credit to conduct a wide, efficient search for
external capital. Once again, small businesses face rules that compound
their natural disadvantage in capital formation.
3.

Regulation D Offerings

Regulation D is made up of three basic offering rules that provide
exemptions from registration for increasingly large offerings: Rule 504
provides an exemption for offerings up to $1 million,8 9 Rule 505 provides
an exemption for offerings up to $5 million, 9° and Rule 506 provides an
exemption for offerings in unlimited amounts. 9'
All three of the exemptions, however, impose conditions that
significantly limit the access of small businesses to potential investors. All
three prohibit any general advertising, 92 once again severely restricting the

8917 C.F.R.

§ 230.504(b)(2) (2005).

9°1d. § 230.505(b)(2)(i).
91
1d. § 230.506.
92
The prohibition against general advertising, which is found in Rule 502(c), id.
§ 230.502(c), is incorporated into the general conditions of Rule 504, id. § 230.504(b)(1), Rule
505, id. § 230.505(b)(1), and Rule 506, id. § 230.506(b)(1).
The history of the prohibition on general advertising in Rule 504 offerings merits at least
brief mention here because it highlights, unfortunately, the Commission's failure to understand the
impact of combined state and federal regulation on capital formation by small issuers and suggests
a Commission bias against small businesses.
As originally adopted, Rule 504 prohibited general advertising, unless offers and sales
were made pursuant to state registration and disclosure requirements, an exception which rarely
was used. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(b)(1) and 502(c) (1983), adopted in Securities Act Release No.
33-6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,106, at 84,917-18 (Mar. 8,
1982). In 1992, however, the Commission amended the Rule to permit the use of general
advertising in a Rule 504 offering. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(b)(1) and 502(c) (1993). In 1999, the
Commission reversed itself and reimposed a prohibition against general advertising in Rule 504.
Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 7644, [1999 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 186,114 (Apr. 7, 1999). The basis to reinstate the prohibition on general
advertising in Rule 504 offerings was a perception of fraudulent conduct by small businesses
utilizing Rule 504. The Commission referenced cases of "manipulation of the over-the-counter
markets" and other "illegal practices," although citing only five cases involving problems with
solicitations. Id. at 81,771 n.14.
All of this suggests a failure of the Commission to understand the reality of small
business financing and a bias against small businesses. The original lifting of the prohibition
against general advertising was entirely ineffectual because states continued to enforce rules that
prohibited such activities by issuers utilizing Rule 504. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying
text. The decision to reimpose a prohibition on general advertising was seemingly made on the
thinnest of evidence concerning fraudulent Rule 504 offerings and failed to give proper
consideration to the facts that the Commission has a broad array of antifraud weapons in its
arsenal.
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search strategies small businesses may use to find investors. 93 All three
rules further limit the investor pool by imposing resale restrictions on
Regulation D securities. 94 Both Rule 505 and Rule 506 reduce the investor
pool even more by limiting the number of unaccredited investors to thirtyfive.95 Finally, Rule 506 also requires all investors to be accredited or
sophisticated.96

State requirements further complicate the matters for small
businesses relying on Regulation D. Normally, a Rule 504 offering will be
coordinated with the state small offering exemption, 97 which may include
93

The definition of "general advertising" is less than entirely clear. But, certainly broad
solicitations-even if the ultimate number of purchasers is quite limited-would not be
permissible. Thus this would include media advertising of any kind, Internet announcements, and
generally any broad blind solicitation of interested investors. See, e.g., Stuart R. Cohn, The
Impact of Securities Laws on Developing Companies: Would the Wright Brothers Have Gotten
Offthe Ground?,3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 315,359 (1999) ("No limitation characterizes
the phobia of securities regulators more than the prohibitions against general advertising and
solicitation.").
"The limitation of resales found in Rule 502(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2005), is
incorporated into the general conditions of Rule 504, id. § 230.504(b)(1), Rule 505, id.
§ 230.505(b)(1), and Rule 506, id. § 230.506(b)(1).
Shares acquired in a Regulation D offering are considered to have been acquired in a nonpublic transaction under Section 4(2). Id. § 230.502(d) ("shall have the status of securities
acquired in a transaction under Section 4(2) of the Act"). Resales of the securities of small
businesses acquired in a Regulation D offering, therefore, would most likely require at least a twoyear holding period, if the resales are made under Rule 144(k) or the common law, or require that
the resales be made privately under the so-called "Section 4(1 ) exemption." See discussion at
Campbell, Resales of Securities, supra note 56, at 1341-46.
9517 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), 230.506(b)(2)(i) (2005).
96
1d. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (stating that each purchaser must either be "accredited" or
"alone or with his purchaser representative(s) ... [possess] such knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
prospective investment").
97
UNIF. SEC. Acr § 402(b)(9), 7C U.L.A. 220 (2000). Another way that a small issuer
may meet state requirements in a Rule 504 offering is through registration with the state on a
registration statement, referred to as "SCOR," which is especially designed for small unregistered
offerings. Because of its complexity and costs, SCOR has never been a popular way for most
small issuers to coordinate state compliance with a Rule 504 offering. Thus, although in 1997 the
Commission reported that thirty-six states had adopted the SCOR form and four additional states
informally permitted use of the form, small businesses have rarelyt used the form, SEC, Report
on the Uniformity of State Regulatory Requirements for Offerings of Securities That Are Not
"CoveredSecurities" (Oct. 11, 1997), availableat http//www.sec.gov/newslstudiesluniformity.
htm, sampling from particular states that show how little SCOR registrations are used. In an
article published in 2000, the author surveyed ten sample states regarding the number of SCOR
filings received.
[A]ccording to information gathered from ten sample states, Iowa reports that
only four SCOR registration statements became effective in that state during
each of the calendar years 1997, 1998, and 1999. Indiana reports that only two
SCOR registration statements became effective between January, 1997 and
August 1999. Information gathered from other sample states reflects similarly
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an additional severe limitation on the number of offerees or purchasers.9 8
Coordination of a Rule 505 offering with state rules will typically involve
meeting the ULOE requirements, which impose additional conditions, such
as sophistication and suitability for all unaccredited investors. 99
Regulation D, therefore, does not offer small businesses competitive
access to a broad pool of investors.
3. Summary
Small businesses face formidable structural and economic
impediments when they attempt to acquire external capital. Regulators
significantly exacerbate these problems by imposing rules that foreclose a
broad and efficient search for capital by small businesses.
IV. REGULATION A
A. HistoricalOverview of Section 3(b) and RegulationA
To facilitate an understanding of today's Regulation A and the
reasons for its extreme underuse, this part offers a brief overview of the
evolution of Section 3(b) and Regulation A.
1. Section 3(b)
Section 3(b), which is not self-executing, provides the statutory basis

modest utilization of SCOR.
Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The InsidiousRemnants ofState Rules RespectingCapitalFormation,
78 WASH. U. L.Q. 407, 424 (2000) (citations omitted).
In most states, Rule 504 offerings cannot be made under the ULOE because, as
promulgated by NASAA and adopted by most states, the ULOE offers state exemptions only for
offerings under Rule 505 and Rule 506. See Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, NASAA Rep.
(CCH) 1 6201, at 6101 (May 1989). A few states, however, have adopted a form of the ULOE
that permits Rule 504 offerings to be coordinated with the state's ULOE. See, e.g., Campbell,
supra, at 422 (out of a ten state sample, one state had not adopted the ULOE, two states permitted
coordination with Rule 504, and seven states have limited coordination under the ULOE to
offerings made under Rule 505 and Rule 506).
98
Rule 504 contains no limitation on the number of offerees or purchasers, except the
prohibition against general advertising. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2005). State small offering
exemptions, however, typically severely limit the number of offerees or purchasers. The Uniform
Securities Act, for example, limits the offering to ten offerees within a twelve-month period.
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7C U.L.A. 220 (2000). The Uniform Act's small offering exemption
also prohibits selling commissions. Id.
"Uniform Limited Offering Exemptions, Section 1, D, 1 & 2, NASAA Rep. (CCH)
16201, at 6103 (May 1989).
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for Regulation A. Over the last seventy years, there have been relatively
few changes in the statute, itself,"m although Congress has from time to
time raised the limit of Section 3(b). As originally adopted in the 1933 Act,
the limit of the Commission's authority to adopt exemptions "in the public
interest" was $100,000.'°' Twelve years later, in 1945, Congress tripled the
limit, raising it to $300,000.'02 The limit remained stuck there for twentyfive years, until Congress modestly raised the limit to $500,000 in 1970.'03
In May of 1978, Congress tripled that limit, raising it to $1.5 million,"° and
then raised the limit to $2 million five months later in the year.'0 5 Finally
in 1980, Congress
raised the Section 3(b) limit to its present level of $5
million.'0 6
2. Regulation A
The Commission adopted the original version of Regulation A in
1936,107 although that original version looked almost nothing like the
Regulation A of today.'0 8 In 1941, the Commission substantially revised
Regulation A, °9 but it was not until 1953 that the Commission established

"WCompareSecurities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, § 3, 48 Stat. 75 (1934), with 15
U.S.C.A. § 77c(b) (West 2005).
' 0 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, § 3, 48 Stat. 75 (1934).
02
1 Ch. 122, 59 Stat. 167 (1946).
103
Pub. L. No. 91-565, 84 Stat. 1480 (1971).
'°4Pub. L. No. 95-283, § 18, 92 Stat. 275 (1980).
05
Pub. L. No. 95-425, § 2, 92 Stat. 962 (1980).
'6Pub.L. No. 96-477, tit. III, § 301, 94 Stat. 2291 (1981) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. § 77c(b) (West 2005)).
l"Securities Act Release No. 627-632, 1936 WL 30895 (Jan. 21, 1936).
' 08For a description of the original Regulation A and an excellent history of Regulation
A, see HICKS, supra note 14, §§ 6.2-6.4; 3 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1322-27 (3d ed. 1989).
'09Securities Act Release No. 2410, Fed. Sec. L. Serv. (CCH) 75,111, at 75,119
(Dec. 3, 1940). For an excellent discussion of the substance of the version of Regulation A
adopted by the Commission in 1941, see Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 380-87 (1951).
Professor Hicks provides an interesting overview of these 1941 amendments and the
shape of Regulation A until the 1953 Amendments. Underthe 1941 amendments, Professor Hicks
reports that "the SEC abandoned completely the need for an issuer to use an offering document
with prescribed information or to subject its offering materials to the Commission's examination
procedures." HICKS, supra note 14, § 6.3, at 6-20. He continues in a footnote to outline the
administrative requirements for the Regulation A exemption during that period:
To use the simplified Regulation A, a domestic issuer was only required to send
to the nearest SEC regional office a letter notifying the Commission of its
intention to sell, together with any selling literature it planned to use. The letter
of notification required a minimum of information, i.e., the name of the
company, the name of the underwriter, the name of the issue to be sold, and a
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the regulatory model for Regulation A that essentially survives today." 0
The last significant revision of Regulation A occurred in 1992, when
the Commission, as part of its small business initiatives, raised the limit of
the regulatory exemption to $5 million and adopted its much debated "test
the waters" mechanism through which issuers are able to solicit indications
of interest from potential investors before preparing and distributing an
offering circular."'
Little noticed in these 1992 amendments was the elimination of Rule
257, which had authorized a Regulation A offering of up to $100,0001 12
without filing or distributing an offering circular.'
The logic of
eliminating Rule 257 was based on the fact that the Commission in the
same release eliminated the prohibition against general advertising for Rule
504 offerings. 4 Rule 504, therefore, became more attractive than Rule
257 for small public offerings.
When, however, the Commission reversed itself regarding Rule 504
5
and once again prohibited general advertising in most Rule 504 offerings," 1
the Commission did not restore to Regulation A any mechanism allowing
small Regulation A offerings with no disclosure requirements or
diminished requirements. Today, therefore, small issuers are able to meet
the requirements of Regulation A only through filing an offering statement
with the Commission and supplying investors with an offering circular.
B. PresentIteration of Section 3(b) and Regulation A
Regulation A has received extensive attention from scholars," 6
including Professor William Hicks, whose treatise on exempt securities

brief summary of the intended use of the proceeds.
Id. at 6-20 n.22.
"°Securities Act Release No. 3466, 1953 WL 5669 (Mar. 6, 1953). According to
Professor Hicks, the rules and forms adopted in Release 3466 for Regulation A "formed the basis
for their counterparts under the present form of Regulation A." HicKs, supra note 14, at 6-20
n.24.
"'Securities Act Release No. 6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442 (Aug. 13, 1992).
" 2 In 1978 the Commission amended Rule 257, raising its limit from $50,000 to
$100,000. Increase in Amount of Small Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33-5977,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,710 (Sept. 11, 1978).
11317 C.F.R. § 230.257 (1991). A condition of Rule 257, however, required the issuer
to file as an exhibit to its notification much of the information required in the offering circular,
except financial statements. Id. § 230.257(a).
" 4Securities Act Release No. 33-6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442 (Aug. 13. 1992).
"517 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1), 502(c) (2005).
6
1 See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 12, at 203-10; Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 109, at
1319-38.
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transactions devotes over 200 pages to a fine and exhaustive discussion of
Regulation A." 7 The purpose in this section, therefore, is not to restate the
work of these scholars but, instead, to explain and discuss Regulation A
only to the extent necessary to understand the bases for its failures and
underuse and to provide a springboard for a discussion of the author's
prescription for this fallow but potentially significant exemption.
1. Section 3(b)
Today, Section 3(b) authorizes the Commission to enact exemptions
from the registration requirements for offerings of up to $5 million dollars,
subject only to the requirement that the Commission finds that the
registration "is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of
investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character
of the public offering.""'
The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NISMA)
provides an important, mandatory gloss to Section 3(b). NSMIA directs
that when the Commission is required in its rulemaking to act "in the public
interest," it must "consider, in addition to the protection of investors,
whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation."" 9 NISMA, therefore, amounts to a clear directive for the
Commission to give enhanced consideration to efficiency, competition and
capital formation in connection with rules it promulgates under Regulation
A.
2. Regulation A-Maximum Offering Size
Turning to Regulation A itself, since 1992 the Commission 2 ° has
exercised its maximum authority concerning the size of Regulation A
offerings, permitting use of the exemption for offerings of up to $5 million
in any twelve-month period. 121 If one focuses on smaller businesses, such
as those with less than twenty employees, this $5 million ceiling seems
more than adequate to meet the needs or capital raising abilities of most
small issuers.

I7HICKS, supra note
1815

14, at 6-1 to 6-204.

U.S.C.A. § 77c(b) (West 2005).

"91d. § 77b(b).
2
'In 1992, the Commission raised the maximum Regulation A offering to $5 million.
Securities Act Release No. 33-6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442 (Aug. 13, 1992).
12117 C.F.R. § 230.25 1(b) (2005) ('$5,000,000 ., less the aggregate offering price

for all securities sold within the twelve months before the start of and during the offering of
securities in reliance upon Regulation A").
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3. Regulation A-Nature of the Issuer, Its Managers, Employees,
Underwriters, Etc.
The availability of Regulation A is predicated on a number of
conditions involving the issuer and persons associated with the issuer in its
securities offering.
To be eligible for Regulation A, an issuer cannot be a reporting
company under the 1934 Act. 22 The point of this requirement is apparently
to force public offerings by larger, 1934 Act companies onto either S
Forms 123 or SB Forms,124 with their more extensive disclosure requirements.
Regulation A also is unavailable for offerings by "a development
stage company that either has no specific business plan or purpose, or has
indicated that its business plan is to merge with an unidentified
company." 125 While this preclusion on its face seems somewhat ambiguous
and thus possibly subject to a broad interpretation, the Commission in the
release adopting the latest version of this requirement suggested a narrow
reading of the preclusion. The Commission indicated that it applies only
to offerings by a "blank check" company, which is defined in the Release
as a company "that has no specific business or plan except to locate and
26
acquire a presently unknown business or opportunity."1
127
Of the other factors that exclude the availability of Regulation A,
the most notorious are the so-called "bad boy" provisions, which preclude
the use of Regulation A if either the issuer or certain persons affiliated with
2
the issuer have committed any one of a number of enumerated bad acts. 1
Thus, for example, Regulation A is unavailable for an offering if a stop
order has been issued against any offering of the issuer within the last five
22
' The exemption is available only to an issuer that "[i]s not subject to section 13 or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . immediately before the offering." Id.
§ 230.251 (a)(2).
123
Forms S-1, S-2, and S-3 are the general forms available for registration of public
offerings of securities. See, e.g., id. § § 239.11-239.13.
2
'he SB forms are forms to be used by a "small business issuer" for registration of
their securities offered to the public. See, e.g., id. § 239.9 (discussing Form SB-I).
12117 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(3) (2005). In his treatise, Professor Hicks offers an
exhaustive history of this provision. HICKS, supra note 14, §§ 6.27-6.38.
26
1 Securities Act Release No. 33-6949, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,443 n.50 (Aug. 13, 1992).
127
In addition to the limitations on availability discussed in the text, the issuer must be
either a U.S. or Canadian company, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(1) (2005), and cannot be an
investment company. Id. § 230.251 (a)(4). Regulation A also is not available for the issuance of
fractional undivided interests in oil and gas rights. Id. § 230.25 1(a)(5). In his treatise, Professor
Hicks offers a discussion of these issues. See, e.g., HICKS, supra note 14, § 6.8 (discussing
requirement of issuer's residence).
' 28 Once again, Professor Hicks provides an extensive discussion of these "bad boy"
provisions. HICKS, supra note 14, §§ 6.10-6.26.
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years129 or if any director, officer or 10% shareholder of the issuer or any
underwriter of the Regulation A offering has, within ten years, been
convicted of certain felonies as a result of securities transactions. 3 0
While one may wish to argue about the wisdom of some of these
predicates, none of these requirements broadly eliminates the availability
of Regulation A for the types of small businesses that are the focus of this
article, and none limits a broad search for investors by small businesses in
search of capital.
4. Regulation A-Filing and Disclosure Requirements
The heart of Regulation A is the obligation of the issuer to file an
offering statement with the SEC' and the obligation to provide investors
with an offering circular. 132 These documents-the offering statement and
the offering circular-are roughly analogous to the registration statement
and prospectus in registered offerings.
The offering statement filed with the Commission is made up of four
components-the notification, the offering circular, the exhibits and a
signature page. 133 The notification contains nine rather simple informational items that are deemed relevant only for the Commission and its
processing of the Form 1-A.' 34 The exhibits, which also normally are not
provided to investors, are made up of only nine items.'35 The exhibits
required in Form 1-A are similar to those required by SK 601 for registered
offerings.' 36 Normally, compiling and supplying the Commission with the
necessary exhibits should not run up costs in ways that are troublesome for
a small issuer.

12917 C.F.R. § 230.262(a)(1) (2005).
(discussing preclusionary acts by issuer).

13017

See HICKS, supra note 14, §§ 6.10-6.16

C.F.R. § 230.262(b)(1) (2005). In his treatise, Professor Hicks offers an

extensive discussion of the acts by entities other than the issuer that eliminate the availability of
Regulation A. See, e.g., HICKS, supra note 14, §§ 6.17-6.26.
13117 C.F.R. § 230.251 (d)(i) (2005).
32
1 1d. § 230.25 1(d)(2).
33
1 See
34
1 See

Form I-A, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,476.

Part I-Form 1-A, Notification of Form l-A, id. (includes, for example,
requirements to disclose names and addresses of directors, officers, counsel and underwriters and
disclosure as to whether any of the foregoing are subject to disqualification under the "bad boy"

provisions of Rule 262).

135See Form I-A, Part In-Exhibits of Form I-A, id. at 36,492 (includes underwriting
agreement, articles of incorporation, bylaws, and material contracts).
36

S-K 601, which establishes exhibit requirements for registered offering, contains

twenty-six items, although not all items are required as exhibits in any registered offering). 17
C.F.R. § 229.601 (2005).
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The offering circular'37 is the part of the offering statement that
contains the essential investment information and is the document that most
fundamentally underpins the policy basis for Regulation A. Drafting the
offering circular also generates the most costs associated with a Regulation
A offering for the issuer.
Presently, the SEC permits corporate issuers utilizing Regulation A
to pick from among three formats for the offering circular.' 38 All three
require that the issuer supply each investor with substantial investment
information about the issuer and the offering. Model A, for example,
which is in a question and answer format, has forty-nine matters (plus the
financial statements requirement) that must be addressed. 39 Model B
requires the issuer to disclose information concerning twelve broad items,
which look much like the information required by the S Forms and
Regulation S-K. 14
The narrative disclosures required in the offering circular include
information about the issuer's business, properties, pending and threatened
litigation, risk factors, officers and directors (including experience and
compensation paid to them by the issuer), stock ownership, and use of
proceeds."'4 Although less extensive than the corresponding disclosures
required in a prospectus in a registered offering, 42
' the narrative disclosures
in an offering circular are substantial. In fact, the disclosures may be made
even more substantial by the natural tendency of counsel to rely on the S
Forms, Regulation S-X and counsel's general experiences
from registered
43
circular.
offering
an
writing
in
guidance
offerings for

137

See Form l-A, Part 11-Offering Circular, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,477.
1381d.
39

' Form 1-A, Offering Circular Model A, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,477.

"4Form 1-A, Offering Circular Model B, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,488.
Form 1-A, Offering Circular Model B, Items 3-10, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,488.
Interestingly, Offering Circular Model A has a requirement for disclosing material litigation, see
Form I-A, Offering Circular Model A, Item 43, id. at 36,487, while Model B has no express
litigation provision. Nonetheless, it seems likely that counsel would insist that the issuer disclose
all material litigation.
"42See, e.g., HICKS, supra note 14, § 6.63 ("offering circular is often thought of as a
smaller version of the prospectus used in registered offerings").
14 3
Thus in his treatise, under his heading of "Some practical suggestions," Professor
Hicks suggests that the sensible approach for counsel preparing an offering circular is to rely on
Regulation S-K and "standard instructions for preparing a prospectus." Id. at 6-100. One
example relevant to Professor Hicks' "practical suggestion" jumps out at anyone with experience
in drafting registration statements and proxy statements and makes Professor Hicks' point vividly.
Item 9 in Model B requires disclosure of the latest "aggregate annual remuneration" paid certain
senior officers and proposed future remuneration to be paid to the officers under any plan. Form
I-A, Offering Circular Model B, Item 9, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,490. The Item appears to be simple
and certainly is brief, taking up less than one-half a page in the CCH Federal Securities Law
4
1 'See
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An offering circular also must contain prescribed financial
information, which includes a one year balance sheet and income
information for two years, plus any interim period necessary to bring the
44
latest annual income information down to the date of the balance sheet.'
All financial statements must be prepared according to generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) but do not 1have
to conform to Regulation S45
audited.
be
to
have
not
do
usually
X and
This discussion suggests that the costs involved in preparing and
distributing the offering statement and the offering circular are significant
relative to the yields from a smaller offering. These relative costs are an
important reason why small businesses seeking small amounts of capital so
rarely rely on Regulation A. Related to these relatively high offering costs
is a fear that small issuers and their counsel may have of getting tangled up
in administrative actions as a result of filing an offering statement with the
Commission. Issuers may fear that a Commission review of their offering
statement will expose the company to the risk of delays in their financing,
extended staff conferences, and costly and protracted adjustments to their
filings required by the Commission's staff. These matters may be
especially daunting to issuers relying on counsel who are less experienced
in financings and matters of securities regulation.
C. The Impact of State Blue Sky Laws on the Availability
of RegulationA
While the costs and complexities of complying with federal
requirements make Regulation A substantially less attractive for small
businesses, the costs exacted by state blue sky regulation may be an even
more significant factor in the underuse of Regulation A by small
Reporter. The Item and its instructions, however, leave unanswered, for example, the nature of
the disclosure obligation of the issuer regarding incentive based compensation-stock option
plans, for example-and pension benefits that accrue during the year. Counsel crafting these
remuneration disclosures would most certainly turn to Item 402 of Regulation S-K as a guide to
fashioning disclosures relating to such matter. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402.
'"Form 1-A, Part F/S, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,491.
145ld. It is instructive to compare the financial disclosure requirements in a Form 1-A
to those in a registered offering. For example, Form S- I requires two years audited balance sheets
and three years audited income information, and the financial information must comply with
Regulation S-X. See Item 11 of Form S-1 (requiring compliance with Regulation S-X), 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.3-01(a) (2005) (requiring two years audited balance sheets); id. § 210.3-02(a) (requiring
three years of audited income information).
If the issuer is able to qualify as a "small business issuer," see id. § 228.10(a)(1) and thus
file on Form S-B, the issuer is required to provide one year balance sheet and two years income
information, which must be audited but is not required to be made compliant with Regulation S-X.
Id. § 228.310.
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businesses.
In the legislative process that led to the enactment of NSMIA,
Congress considered 4 6 but ultimately failed to preempt the authority of
state securities regulators over offerings made under Regulation A. 4 7 As
a result, a small business making a Regulation A offering is still obliged in
each state in which it offers its securities either to register the securities
with the state or qualify for a state exemption to the state registration
obligation. 4
State exemptions from registration almost never work well with a
Regulation A offering, principally because the only state exemption broadly
available for a Regulation A offering is the state small offering
exemption. 4 9 That exemption severely limits the number of offerees or
purchasers and thus destroys the principal benefit of a Regulation A
offering, which is the right to offer securities publicly. 5 °
Various states have enacted up to three different methods for
registering a Regulation A offering. The first of these adopted by states
was the traditional, registration by qualification.' 5' Later, a number of
states adopted a new registration form-the SCOR form' 52-for registering

'"An earlier House version of the legislation that became NSMIA would have
preempted state control over nearly all securities offerings, except offerings made under the
intrastate exemption. Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995, H.R. 2131,
104th Cong. (1995). If this version had been adopted, the Commission would have had exclusive
authority in all Regulation A offerings.
14715 U.S.C.A. § 77r(b)(4) (West 2005). See Campbell, supra note 64, at 198-99
("Glaringly absent from... [preemption] are securities issued in transactions exempt under
Section 3(a)(1 1), which includes Rule 147, underSection 3(b), which includes Rule 504, Rule 505
and Regulation A, and under the common law of Section 4(2).").
14
'For a basic description of the registration requirements under state blue sky laws, see
supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
149
See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b), 7C U.L.A. 220 (2000). See supra notes 64-72
and accompanying text.
'- 'See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
For examples of statutes of states that have adopted a registration by qualification

statute, see IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.207 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1258
(Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.370 (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:705(B)
(West 2003); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10,404 (West 1999).
52
1 The SCOR (Small Corporate Offering Registration) form--Form U-7-was
developed jointly by NASAA and a committee of the American Bar Association. Small
CorporateOfferings RegistrationForm (Form U-7), NASAA Rep. (CCH) 1 5057, at 5197 (Dec.
1999). At least forty-three states have, officially or unofficially, adopted SCOR. Small
Corporate Offering Registration Program and Form U-7, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 6461
(Apr. 2005).
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offerings of up to $1 million, including Regulation A offerings. 5 3 The
SCOR form was specifically tailored for small issuers and was supposed to
be simpler and less costly than a registration by qualification.' 54
Neither of these registration methods has ever worked for
Regulation A offerings. Although both registration by qualification and
registration through the SCOR form preserve the right of the issuer to make
an unlimited number of offers and sales, the additional costs and
complexities added to a Regulation A offering apparently overwhelm any
benefits to the issuer. Perhaps most disappointingly, the SCOR form,
which was designed to ameliorate the complexity and costs of a
qualification registration, is rarely used by the thousands of small issuers
searching for capital.'
More recently, some states have begun to permit registration through
coordination with a Regulation A offering.'5 6 Essentially, this method
allows issuers relying on Regulation A to meet their state obligations by
filing their Form 1-A with the state. Obviously, permitting a state registration of a Regulation A offering by coordination significantly reduces state
compliance costs.
Not all states have adopted registration by coordination with a
Regulation A offering. From a sample of ten states,'57 three of the states
permit registration by coordination with Regulation A, 5 8 and another three
states, although technically not permitting registration of a Regulation A
offering by coordination, have adopted regimes that are essentially
53

Under NASAA's policy SCOR filing is available for offerings under Rule 504,
Regulation A and Section 3(a)(l 1). Statement of Policy Regarding Small Company Offering
Registrations,NASAA Rep. (CCH) 411 (Nov. 1999). Some states, however, do not permit
Regulation A offerings to be registered on the SCOR form. E.g., ILL. ADMIN CODE tit. 14,
§ 130.525(a)(8) (2005) (SCOR available for Rule 504 offerings); MtCH. ADMIN. CODE r.
451,803.11(1) (2005) (SCOR available for offerings under Rule 504 and Section 3(a)(1 1)).
154
An examination of the SCOR form as adopted by states and the accompanying rules
regarding its use in those states suggests that the initiative may not have met these objectives. See
Campbell, supra note 98, at 423-24.
55
' 1d., at 424. The data reported in that article include SCOR filings for offerings under
Regulation A and other exemptions as well.
56
1 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.360 (West 2004).
' 57The author used a sample of 20% of the state jurisdictions, consisting of his home
state, Kentucky, and nine states that lie closest to Kentucky in the alphabet. Thus the states
considered were: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, and Michigan.
158States from the sample with either statutory or regulatory authority for registration
of a Regulation A offering by coordination include: Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.206 (West
1999); Kentucky, KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 292.360 (West 2004), and Maryland, MD. CODE ANN.,
CoRps. & Ass'NS § 11-503(d)(1) (1999) (Maryland, however, requires the issuer to petition the
Commissioner for an order permitting registration by coordination. Id. § 11-206(e) (issuance of
interpretive opinions, $100 fee required)).
1
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equivalent to registration by coordination.' 5 9 Four of the states in the ten
state sample, however, do not have a coordination or coordinationequivalent regime available for Regulation A offerings."6
This data suggests, then, that a substantial number of states still do
not allow Regulation A offerings to be registered by coordination. In such
states, a Regulation A offering would typically require that the issuer either
file a qualification registration or meet the requirements of some small or
161
limited offering exemption that does not permit general advertising.
Either of these options effectively destroy Regulation A as a vehicle for
small businesses to use in raising capital.
Even in states that provide a coordination or coordination-equivalent
regime, meeting state requirements in a Regulation A offering may not be
as smooth as one might imagine. States have a way of imposing idiosyncratic conditions on their securities laws 162 and reserving administrative
discretion to the securities staff processing registration statements. 163 To

159

The states are: Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:709 (5)(a) (West 2003)
(Regulation A offerings can qualify as exempt transactions, provided the issuer meets certain
filing requirements and pays prescribed fees); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 1 10A,§ 302
(West 1999) (permits registration by coordination only for registered offerings) and 950 MASS.
CODE REGS. 13.303(A)(2) (2005) (issuer can meet qualification registration requirements by
filing its federal Form I-A with state); and Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 451.703 (2001)
(coordination only with registered offerings) and Use of Form U-7for Regulation A Offerings,
2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 32,639, at 27,624 (Sept. 1997) ("The Bureau will accept Form I-A
... as a recognized disclosure document for Regulation A offerings that are filed under.., the
Michigan Uniform Securities Act ....
").
'60The states are: Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, and Maine.
6
' For example, in Maine, registration of a Regulation A offering would be by
qualification. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10,404 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004). If the offering
were not more than $1 million, the offering could be registered on the SCOR form. 02-032-525
ME. CODE R. § 9 (Weil 2005). Alternatively, the issuer could use one of Maine's small offering
exemptions. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10,502.2.J (West 1999) (providing that an exempt
transaction includes "[a]ny offer or sale of a preorganization certificate.., if no commission...
is paid ...for soliciting any prospective customer, no public advertising or general solicitation
is used in connection with the offer or sale, the number of subscribers does not exceed 10 and no
payment is made by any subscriber"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10,502.2.P (Supp. 2004)
(exemption conditioned on no more than ten holders after offering and no general advertising);
and id. § 10,502.2.Q (permitting offers without general advertising [and meeting other
conditions], provided no more than 25 holders after the offering).
62
See, e.g., Maynard, supra note 70 (discussing differences in the Uniform Limited
Offering Exemption as adopted by various states).
63
' For example, Maryland, which the author classifies as a coordination registration
state, allows a Regulation A offering to be registered by coordination "in the manner the
Commissioner by rule or order may prescribe." MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'N § 11-503(d)(1)
(1999). This means that one wishing to register a Regulation A offering by coordination must
petition the Commissioner for an order. The Commissioner has outlined what is required in such
a petition:
In order to meet the requirements of § 11-503, [the issuer] should submit to the
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the extent states do not provide uniform rules respecting registration by
coordination or impose regulatory hurdles to the availability of their
particular coordination registration, transaction costs increase, making
Regulation A less attractive. These problems, obviously, become more
significant when an offering involves a number of states.
Finally, permitting state registration by coordination for Regulation
A offerings does not necessarily protect the issuer from the loss of
Regulation A benefits. Consider the "test the waters" provision of Regulation A." 4 Under that rule, issuers are able to solicit indications of interest
in a Regulation A offering before writing the Form 1-A, even though the
activity otherwise would amount to an unauthorized "offer" of a security in
violation of the provisions of the 1933 Act.' 65 The benefit to the issuer, of
course, is that it can better gauge the demand for its securities, before
investing the significant amount of money necessary to put together a
Regulation A offering. Adopting a rule permitting a Regulation A offering
to be registered by coordination does not necessarily affect the
determination of whether prefiling testing of the water activity amounts to
an illegal offer under state law."6 Thus, a state permitting registration by
coordination could take the position that prefiling testing of the water
activity amounts to illegal gun jumping under state law. The small business
using Regulation A in such a case would have to forego the benefits of
testing the waters in order meet state blue sky law requirements.
State blue sky laws continue to impose substantial costs on small
businesses attempting to utilize Regulation A and thus amount to a
continuing, material impediment to its use.
D. The Underuse of RegulationA-An Exemption Without a Niche
Today, Regulation A is essentially unused because it does not have

Division of Securities three copies of your Reg A filing; a form U-1 or the
Maryland Application for Registration of Securities by Coordination..., a form
U-2, Consent to Service of Process, naming the "Commissioner of Securities,"
and a filing fee representing 1/10th of one percent of the aggregate offering price
of securities to be offered in Maryland, with a minimum fee of $100.000 and a
maximum fee of $500.00.
Morgan Bancorp, Inc., 1982 Md. Sec. No-Act. LEXIS 119 (Nov. 16, 1982).
16417 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (2005).
1651d
166Two noted commentators reported the opposition of state securities administrators
to the "test the waters" provision. See Sargent, supra note 9, at 477-79; Steinberg, supra note 9,
at 408-11. This may suggest that states, even if they adopted registration of Regulation A
offerings by coordination, would be reluctant to permit such registered offering to be offered
through the federal "test the waters" technique.
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a niche. No matter the size or nature of the offering, the exemption does not
provide small issuers with an attractive alternative for capital formation.
On the small offering end of the Regulation A spectrum, which is the
principal concern in this article, issuers are discouraged from using
Regulation A by the complexities of the filing, disclosure and other
requirements and by the difficulties in many instances of meeting state blue
sky requirements. Together, the costs of meeting these federal and state
requirements overwhelm any benefit a small business would attain from
utilizing Regulation A.
As offerings get larger, one might imagine that Regulation A
becomes more attractive to businesses in search of capital. The allimportant relative offering costs-the costs of the offering in relation to the
yield from the offering-decrease as the size of the offering goes up, and
because the narrative and financial disclosures required in Regulation A are
less onerous than those required in a registration statement, it may at first
seem surprising that so few Regulation A offerings are made, for example,
around the $5 million area.
It appears, however, that the advantages of a Regulation A offering
at such higher levels still do not make up for lingering difficulties. State
law compliance problems are probably the most apparent among these
problems.'67 For example, a Regulation A offering of $5 million in twentyfive states would likely present problems with state securities laws so
overwhelmingly complex that they would swamp any benefit from reduced
disclosure costs. Based on the previous ten state sample, one surely would
expect to encounter extreme difficulties coordinating such an offer with
twenty-five sets of differing state blue sky laws.' 68 On the other hand, if the
$5 million offer were registered on a Form SB with the Commission, state
blue sky requirements could be met through registration by coordination,
which is an enormous advantage for the issuer.
It is unlikely, therefore, that Regulation A as presently constituted,
or even if increased in its limit, will have a significant role in the capital
formation activities of small businesses. The shame in all this is that the

67

' Another, perhaps more practical, problem in the use of Regulation A in larger offers

is the unfamiliarity that professionals and investors have with Regulation A offerings. The very

small number of Regulation A offers suggest that Regulation A has an underdeveloped body of
de facto protocols and traditions and surely means that the SEC staff is less experienced in this

area. Experienced SEC lawyers, therefore, face more uncertainty in outcomes in operating in such
an environment, which encourages them to favor registration. Registered offerings also are more
familiar to the investing public and the investment professionals, who may either be involved in

placing the offering or at least advising investors. Considered together, these factors may help
account for the underuse of Regulation A at higher offering levels.
68

' See supra notes 158-69 and infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
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fundamental concepts of Regulation A-providing an exemption from
registration through a disclosure tailored to meet the tension between
capital formation and investor protection-makes perfect sense.
V. PRESCRIPTION FOR REGULATION A

The SEC has never understood or appreciated small businesses.'69
Over the years, the actions of the Commission suggest a suspicion about the
integrity of small business managers and manifest a failure to understand
the importance of small businesses to our national economy and the
importance of accessible capital to small businesses. 7 0 These misunderstandings have shaped today's misdirected and unused Regulation A.
The offered proposals are intended to refocus Regulation A on the
capital needs of truly small issuers and thus to reshape Regulation A into
a vehicle that can be used effectively and efficiently by these small
businesses to access external, non-institutional capital.
A. Broad Public Offering; DisclosurePredicate
The Regulation A proposed in this article would continue the
essential nature of today's Regulation A regime, which permits broad,
public solicitation of investors, conditioned on meaningful, mandatory
disclosure of prescribed investment information prior to sale.
B. Amount Limitations
Concerning the amount limitations for Regulation A, the
Commission must be mindful that both the top and bottom ends of the
Regulation A range are important.
Consider first the appropriate upper limits of a Regulation A
offering. The Commission should approach this as an integrated matter,
with Regulation A as the vehicle through which truly small businesses can
sell small amounts of securities publicly and registration as the vehicle for
selling larger amounts of securities publicly. This stair-stepped approach,
which would be similar to the approach the Commission adopted in

This is a specific criticism and not part of any general dissatisfaction on my part with
the Commission. Indeed, my experience as a securities lawyer assisting clients in capital formation and a professor who has offered opinions and testimony to the Commission leads me to
conclude that the SEC is among our very best governmental agencies.
7
'For an example of these problems, see supra text accompanying note 93.
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Regulation D,' 7 ' amounts to an appropriate accommodation of the tension
between capital formation and investor protection. It would permit smaller
offerings to be sold by meeting the less burdensome disclosure
requirements of Regulation A, while requiring larger offerings with lower
relative offering costs 7 2 to be registered.
Assuming, therefore, that a Form S-B would be the first registration
form an issuer would face as it increased its offering size above the
Regulation A level, the Commission should estimate the minimum offering
size that can practically be made on a Form S-B. The Commission might
conclude that an offering on a Form S-B must be at least $2 million before
the relative offering costs fall to an acceptable, competitive level. That
would then become the maximum amount that could be offered under
Regulation A.
More critical to the discussion in this article, however, is the lower
limit of Regulation A offerings, because of the concern over foreclosure of
small businesses from an efficient hunt for capital. While it is unlikely that
the Commission would ever, as a regulatory matter, establish a lower limit
to the availability of the exemption, the lower limit will be practically and
effectively set primarily by the relative offering costs of Regulation A, and
the bulk of those costs will be generated by the level of disclosures required
by the exemption.
C. Nature and Contentof Disclosures
If the Commission refocuses Regulation A on public offerings by
small businesses, its task then becomes that of establishing a Regulation A
disclosure regime that offers small businesses of the type described in Part
II of this article reasonable and realistic access to the exemption when they
raise capital. The revised Regulation A should be designed in a way that
makes it practically available for offerings of $250,000 or more. With
$250,000 as the defacto threshold for Regulation A offerings, and indulging
an assumption that offering expenses in excess of 10% create substantial
difficulties for small businesses, the Commission's goal should be to design

,7117 C.F.R. § 230.501-.508 (2005). The maximum offering amount under Rule 504,
id. § 230.504, is $1 million, and the Rule does not mandate any particular disclosure as a
prerequisite to its availability. Rule 505, id. § 230.505, and Rule 506, id. § 230.506, which allow,

respectively, offerings of up to $5 million and offerings of unlimited amounts, require enhanced
disclosures as the offerings increase in size. Id. § 230.502(b).
172
1t is relative, not absolute, offering costs that are critical. To use a simplified
example, an offering of $100,000 would not be feasible if the offering costs were $100,000, but
an offering of $100 million would be feasible if offering costs were $100,000.
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a compliance regime that can be met for not more than $25,000. 73
While these numbers appear precise, the exact implementation of all
this should be subject to the Commission's expertise and good judgment.
It is the principle, however, that is critical. The compliance (principally,
disclosure) regime for Regulation A must be set at a level that makes the
exemption reasonably and realistically available for small businesses, and
this requires close attention to the relative offering costs that small
businesses face when making their smallest sized offerings under Regulation A.
Form l-A, the notification that must be filed with the Commission
and that contains the offering circular, will need to be reevaluated and
revised in order to get the offering costs down to a level that will not
swamp a $250,000 offering. In that regard, the following observations and
suggestions are offered.
On the accounting side, stated in general terms, today's Form 1-A
requires the issuer to provide a balance sheet for one year and two years of
income information. 74 The financial information must be consistent with
GAAP, 1" but the financial statements do not have to be audited' and do
to conform to the requirements of the Commission's Regulation
not have
17 7
S_X.

To make Regulation A workable for small businesses, the Commission should reduce the mandatory financial disclosure obligation178 to a
17'Quantifications of this nature, although clearly estimates based on less than perfect
empirical evidence, are the very kind the Commission, utilizing its collective experience and
expertise, must make. Indeed, one is put in mind of Keynes' famous statement, revived by Warren
Buffett in one of his letters to shareholders: "I would rather be vaguely right than precisely
wrong." Warren Buffett, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for CorporateAmerica, 19
CARDOZOL. REV. 1, 185 (1997).
For example, such estimated quantifications might lead the Commission into the
following analysis. The Commission might conclude that about 3/4 of the offering expenses of
a Regulation A offering would be consumed by legal costs. If the Commission estimates that the
average hourly rate for lawyers doing this work is $250 per hour, the compliance should be
designed to require no more than about 75 hours of legal assistance ($25,000 x 3/4 = $18,750;
$18,750 divided by $250 per hour = 75 hours). Such a target-75 hours of legal time-will be
very helpful, as the Commission considers revisions of the Form I-A, for example. Such
quantified analyses may be essential if the Commission is not to repeat its past mistakes.
r14Form I-A, Part F/S, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,491.
175Id. ("financial statements shall be prepared in accordance with generally accepted
principles").
accounting 76
1 Id. ("financial statements need not be audited").
17Id. ("Regulation S-X... shall not apply").
'7The Commission should take some comfort in the ability of the parties to bargain for
more investment information, if it suits their preferences. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Mandatory Disclosureand the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 680-85
(1984) (discussing arguments for and against mandatory disclosure).
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balance sheet and one year of income information.'79 Otherwise, the
present requirements for financial statements in a Regulation A offering
circular strike a sensible balance. Imposing GAAP requirements on the
financial statements is essential to ensuring a common financial language.
Equally appropriate is the omission of a requirement for an audit or
Regulation S-X compliance, which in many cases would add substantial
expenses to an offering circular. Undoubtedly, an audit would enhance
investor protection. But disclosure that the statements are unaudited allows
investors to price the additional risk generated by the absence of an audit,
and antifraud provisions provide the issuer a strong incentive not to
misstate its financial condition. In short, this is a sensible cost-benefit
judgment on the part of the Commission, especially for a Regulation A
refocused on smaller deals.
On the narrative disclosure side, today's requirements for a
Regulation A offering circular-especially those for Offering Circular
Model B,' which is the offering circular model that the author believes
most experienced securities lawyers would choose-go a long way toward
establishing the proper level of disclosure for revised Regulation A., 8 '
Some adjustments are needed, however, as the exemption is refocused on
small public offerings. An example of one such adjustment'8 2 involves the

79

' The risk in limiting income information to a single year (or even two years, as is
presently required) is that a single year may fail adequately to disclose earnings volatility from

year to year. One way for the Commission to deal with this is to require summary financial
information, perhaps modeled on SK 301, see 17 C.F.R. § 229.301, Note 2 (2005), in the event
that within the trailing three years net profits varied more than some predetermined percentage in
any two successive years.
Another idea is to require only one year income information for offerings of less than
$500,000 and two years for offerings above $500,000.
1wForm I-A, Offering Circular Model B, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,488.
8
8'An example of the Commission's sensible approach to disclosure in today's
Regulation A offering circular can be seen in the obligation respecting management
compensation. Item 402 of Regulation S-K, Regulation S-K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402

(2005), runs for almost twenty pages in the CCH Federal Securities Law Reports. 7 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 71,042, at 61,883-5 to 61-900 (1993). Item 9 of Model B simply commands that
the issuer disclose "aggregate annual remuneration," Form I-A, Model B, Item 9(b), 57 Fed. Reg.
at 36,490, and future remunerations to be made pursuant to a plan. Id.
1 2
S The intent here is not to provide a detailed list of suggestions for how the SEC could

appropriately adjust the disclosure requirements for the offering circular, in light of the refocusing
of the exemption on public offerings of less than $2 million. Nonetheless, in addition to revising
obligations about the disclosure of risk factors, the obligation for segment reporting, see Form I-

A, Offering Circular Model B, Item 6(b), 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,489, seems inappropriate for such
smaller issues. Another item that merits reconsideration is the obligaton regarding the disclosure
of the purchase of cheap stock. While it is entirely appropriate to disclose cheap purchases of
stock by insiders, disclosing that matter through references to book value, as is presently required,

seems overly technical and, indeed, confusing. Id. at 36,488, Item 3(b).

HeinOnline -- 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 115 2006

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 31

requirement to include a discussion of risk factors in the offering circular.
While there is some sense to a section on risk factors in a small public
offering under Regulation A, the instructions should expressly state that
disclosure is required only for risks that are material, not reasonably
apparent from the offering circular, and not otherwise known to a
reasonably informed citizen." 3
Finally, the Commission's instructions for the offering circular for
revised Regulation A must be reasonable and intelligible, and the
Regulation A exemption should be available if the offering circular
complies "in all material respects" with the Commission's instructions. In
short, immaterial disclosure failures should not result in the loss of the
Regulation A exemption. The pressure from the possible loss of the
exemption for materially inadequate disclosures provides the correct
balance for society and the small issuers using revised Regulation A. This
also is similar to the position taken with regard to registered offerings,
where courts have found a violation of Section 5 of the 1933 Act in
instances where prospectuses
filed as part of a registration statement are
84
materially inadequate.

D. Offering Flexibility and Meaningful Disclosure
The provisions of a revised Regulation A should offer small issuers
all reasonable flexibility as they set about the very difficult task of
identifying their potential investors. At the same time, the requirements of
the revised exemption should ensure meaningful disclosure to investors
before they make their investment decisions.
To facilitate the proper balance in this regard, revised Regulation A
should retain some effective and efficient form of the "test the waters"
83

The whole idea of disclosing risk factors has gotten somewhat out of hand. For
example, I recently assisted a small regulated gas utility company in a public offering of $12
million of its common stock. This company's entire business consisted of purchasing natural gas
and reselling it to retail customers, nearly all of whom used the gas to heat their homes. The
state's public service commission sets the rates the company charged. The prospectus for this
offering had three pages of risk factors, including a statement that "[w]eather conditions may
cause our revenues to vary from year to year," and "[v]olatility in the price of natural gas could
reduce our profits" and "[t]errorist attacks and threats, escalation of military activity in response
to such attacks or acts of war may negatively affect our earnings and financial condition." See
Delta Natural Gas Co. Prospectus (2003) availableat http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data277375/
000106880003000284/0001068800-03-000284.txt.

4
ii
A.J. White & Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619, 622 (1st Cir. 1977) (affirming SEC order
based on a finding that a material misstatement in a prospectus regarding method and nature of
securities distribution violated Section 5of the 1933 Act); SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458
F.2d 1082, 1098 (2d Cir. 1972) (a materially misleading prospectus violates Section 5 of the 1933

Act).

HeinOnline -- 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 116 2006

2006]

REGULATION A: SMALL BUSINESSES' SEARCH

provision presently found in Rule 254.185 This provision permits issuers
relying on Regulation A to make written or oral offers prior to filing
disclosure documents with the Commission or providing a full-blown
offering circular to investors. 8 6 The clear benefit of the provision for small
issuers is that they are able to search broadly for investors prior to paying
the hefty expenses and enduring the delay that attends the preparation and
filing of a notification and offering circular.
At the same time, no sales under revised Regulation A should be
permitted until the offering circular has been in the hands of offerees for a
period sufficient for them to read and digest the information. Three days
should be a minimum amount of time to meet this goal.
Putting these provisions together, a small business operating under
the revised Regulation A could begin a serious and wide search for
investors before underwriting the significant expense of the offering
circular. This selling effort could involve written or oral efforts and could
involve the use of any medium-newspapers, the Internet, radio, etc.
Interested investors discovered as a result of such a public search could not
be sold securities, however, until an offering circular that is consistent with
the mandated disclosure requirements of revised Regulation A is furnished
to each investor, and the investor has had at least three days to read and
evaluate the investment information. Investors, therefore, would be
protected both by the antifraud provisions under the 1933 Act'8 7 and 1934
Act'88 and by the obligation to deliver the offering circular three days prior
to sale.
It is worth noting that this proposed Regulation A regime would
ensure earlier disclosures of mandatory information than is currently
guaranteed in a registered offering. Under Section 5 of the 1933 Act, once
a registration is filed with the Commission, issuers or underwriters or their
brokers may make oral offers to potential investors without any obligation
to supply a prospectus. 189 Indeed, once the registration becomes effective,
it is permissible for the issuer or underwriter to actually sell the registered
security to an investor without ever having supplied the investor with a

1"517 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (2005).
1

8Id.
Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 771 (West 2005), which is a strong
antifraud provision, would apply to a Regulation A offering. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513
U.S. 561 (1995) (Section 12(a)(1) applicable only to non-private offerings by issuers and control
persons).
1817 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
1 87

'"aSection 5(c) of the 1933 Act prohibits offers before the registration statement is filed.
15 U.S.C.A. § 77e(c) (West 2005). Once the registration statement is filed, offers are, by negative
implication, permitted, and Section 5 nowhere prohibits such offers.
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prospectus. '90
The regime proposed here for a revised Regulation A, therefore,
would provide a cost effective way for small issuers to identify potential
investors, while at the same time ensuring that investors receive and have
time to evaluate the information that the Commission has determined to be
essential to an informed investment decision by investors in small
businesses.
E. Eliminate Needless FederalBureaucracy
Revised Regulation A should remove all unwarranted federal
administrative interference with small issuers using the exemption.
First, any Commission review of Regulation A offerings should be
eliminated. 9 ' Such administrative reviews, especially if Regulation A is
re-directed as a vehicle for truly small issuers to use to make public
offerings, are not cost efficient for society. These reviews add to offering
costs of small issues-both out of pocket expenses and costs associated
with delay and loss of control over the timing of the offering-while it is
difficult to find any equal benefit from such administrative oversight.
Instead of a formal review and comment procedure, issuers utilizing the
revised Regulation A should be obligated to send the Commission copies
no later than
of their offering circular (and other appropriate information)
92
the time they first distribute the materials to investors.1
A similar philosophy should be employed with any "test the waters"
documents.' 93 For the same reasons articulated above, the administrative
intrusion into activities of small businesses attempting to identify potential
investors through the "test the waters" mechanism should be limited to

"9Section5(a)(l) of the 1933 Act prohibits sales of securities, "[ulnless a registration

statement is in effect." Id. § 77e(a)(1). By negative implication sales after the effective date are
permitted, and such sales do not themselves trigger an obligation to precede the sale with the
delivery of a prospectus.
'91Under the present regime for Regulation A, no offer can be made until the Form I-A
is filed, and no sale can be made until the Form I-A has been "qualified." 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)

(2005).

92

' 1t would also be helpful if the Commission would post on its website all offering

circulars that it receives in connection with Regulation A offerings. It should not, however,
require filings to be made consistent with the EDGAR filing regime. Although it would be too
expensive to require filings to be "EDGARized," easy access to previous Regulation A offering
circulars will facilitate and reduce costs for future filers.
193
Although confusingly written, today's rules appear not to require filing of the "test
the waters" documents as a predicate to the availability of the Regulation A exemption. Filing of
the "test the waters" documents does appear to be a predicate for permissible oral offers prior to
the time of filing the Form 1-A. Id. § 230.254(a).
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filing any written documents no later than the first use of those documents.
F. Eliminate State Control Over Regulation A Offerings
Regulation A can never work as an effective, efficient vehicle for
small business capital formation until state control over these offerings is
eliminated. While states themselves have made some progress on this
matter,' 94 state blue sky laws still represent the most important and
troubling bureaucratic interference with appropriate use of Regulation A by
small businesses. Unfortunately, this is also the most difficult problem to
eliminate.
The best way to eliminate state interference is for Congress to
expand the preemption of NSMIA to include securities issued under
Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act.' 9 Unfortunately, operating in the wake of
Enron, Congress will be reluctant to take any action-such as further
preempting state authority over securities regulations-which might appear
to eliminate any protection for investors and society from the excesses of
corrupt management or sharp practices of securities traders. One also
should recall, when considering whether Congress may be willing to
expand the preemption of NSMIA, that the act as originally proposed
preempted authority over Section 3(b) offerings, but that provision was
eliminated during the legislative process.' 96
While one may be pessimistic about the probability of convincing
Congress to revisit this matter, it is important enough to justify a
Commission-led legislative initiative. Although, admittedly, the Commission is vulnerable to similar pressures, such as not wanting to seem soft on
investor protection, if it is serious about providing a meaningful opportunity for small businesses to have a realistic chance to find external capital,
states must be taken completely out of Regulation A offerings.' 97

'94See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
95
1 See

15 U.S.C.A. § 77r(b)(4)(c) (West 2005) (defining "covered securities," which

are preempted by exclusive federal control, to include most securities issued under exemptions
provided by Section 3(a) of the 1933 Act but not securities issued under Section 3(b)).
"9Asoriginally introduced, NSMIA was called the Capital Markets Deregulation and
Liberalization Act of 1995 (the Capital Markets Bill). H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995). That bill

would have preempted essentially all state control over the registration of securities, except state
control over securities issued under the intrastate exemption. See Campbell, supra note 98, at
411-14 (providing a description and analysis of the legislative process leading to the adoption of
NSMIA).
,'This statement applies only to registration matters and not to state antifraud rules.
See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of State Blue Sky Regulation,
10 J. CoRP. L. 553, 575-77 (1985) (discussing the case for federal preemption of state antifraud
rules).
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Otherwise, misdirected, albeit usually well-meaning, state bureaucrats will
retain the power to impose state conditions on Regulation A offerings.
These conditions may well destroy the gains achieved by a revised and
refocused Regulation A.
Even without congressional action, the Commission could on its own
limit the excessive state control over Regulation A offerings in at least two
ways. The Commission's most effective strategy would be to use its
delegated authority under NSMIA to expand the federal preemption of state
securities laws. NSMIA preempts state control over securities offered to
"qualified purchasers" and specifically delegates to the Commission the
obligation to define "qualified purchaser."' 98 The Commission, therefore,
could define "qualified purchaser" to include any investor who is offered
and sold securities under the exemption provided by Regulation A.
In a previous article, I proposed this solution and offered arguments
supporting the appropriateness of this solution, both as a matter of sound
policy and the proper use of legislatively delegated authority. 99 The
Commission, however, seems disinclined to follow any such proposal.
Indeed, to date, not only has the Commission failed to adopt this article's
view of "qualified purchasers," but also it has, during the more than nine
years since the enactment of NSMIA, failed to establish any definition of
"qualified purchaser. "200
The other path for the Commission would be to abandon Regulation
A as a Section 3(b) exemption and move the regime into a registration
format. The Commission could adopt a new registration form along the
lines discussed above for the Regulation A offering circular, making the
form available for small company offerings of up to $2 million. This would
then make offerings under this re-formatted structure eligible for
registration by coordination with the states and would appear to eliminate
much of the expensive and excessive state oversight of these offerings.
Changing to a registration regime, however, is not as attractive as
congressional or Commission preemption because states would retain the

19815 U.S.C.A. § 77r(b)(3) (West 2005).

"'See Campbell, supra note 64, at 207-10.
2
.Late in 2001, the Commission proposed to amend Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146

(2005), to define "qualified purchaser" as "any accredited investor" under Regulation D. Defining
the term "qualified purchasers" under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 8041,
[2001-2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,610, at 85,098 (Dec. 19, 2001). It
was reported that, predictably, NASAA objected to the proposal. NASAA and States Oppose
ProposedDefinition of Qualified Purchaser,202-63 SEC TODAY 1-2 (Apr. 2,2002) ("NASAA
..expressed concerns that the preemption will increase the risk of fraud. States frequently use

violations of their registration provisions as the basis for stopping fraud, NASAA explained.").
The Commission did not adopt the amendment and to date has not defined "qualified purchasers."
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power to neutralize the benefits of such a regime.2 ' As an extreme
example, a state could amend its statutes and eliminate state registration by
coordination for offerings registered under such a new federal regime. A
more likely source of mischief, however, is the power each state would
retain to construct rules regarding offering strategies for such registered
offerings. For example, if the Commission were to adopt rules at the federal
level allowing generous "testing of the waters" actions by the offering
registered under this new regime, states would be entirely free to determine
that testing the waters amounts to illegal "offers" under state laws.
The importance of the fundamental point should not get lost,
however. To the extent that states exercise hegemony over Regulation A,
it is unlikely that Regulation A can ever be an effective exemption for small
businesses. Congressional or regulatory preemption, therefore, is the way
to ensure a single, uniform regime that is sensible and fair to small
businesses involved in capital formation.
G. Summary of the Prescription
Under a revised Regulation A, as described above, small businesses
could offer up to $2 million of their securities predicated on providing
investors a reasonable amount of closely tailored investment information
a reasonable time prior to sale. Small businesses could solicit broadly and
efficiently for investors without inappropriate interference or review from
state or federal bureaucrats. Moreover, small businesses would subject to
only one set of offering and disclosure rules, those of Regulation A.
VI. CONCLUSION

Small businesses are important to our national economy. Yet, they
find it difficult to compete for external capital, an essential component to
the growth or, perhaps, even the survival of many small businesses. The
small size of their capital needs and the absence of financial intermediaries
2 1
Another issue that would make this approach less attractive is the impact of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The requirement to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley is generally predicated on
the company's having a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C.A. § 781 (West 2005), or being subject to the periodic reporting requirements under
Section 15(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(d) (West 2005). See, e.g., Section 2(a)(7) of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 2(a)(7), 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (defining
"issuer" for the purposes of applicability of Sarbanes-Oxley as a company with shares registered
under Section 12 or reporting pursuant to Section 15(d)). A small issuer filing a registration
statement under the 1933 Act would become subject to Section 15(d) of the 1934 Act and thus
subject to the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. This would add significant expenses to the small
issuer's costs of doing business.
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inevitably put small businesses at a big disadvantage when they attempt to
raise capital.
Federal and state securities laws exacerbate these problems. Instead
of enacting laws and regulations that level the playing field for small
businesses, federal and state securities laws impose severe limitations on
the manner in which small businesses are permitted to search for their
external capital. In short, small businesses, already suffering under
substantial structural impediments, are further disadvantaged by federal and
state rules that make an efficient search for external capital essentially
impossible.
Although it has fallen into nearly complete disuse, Regulation A
offers a sensible structure through which these problems can be addressed.
For Regulation A to work for small businesses, however, it must be
significantly revised and protected from state hegemony.
The revised Regulation A proposed in this article would provide an
exemption for pubic offerings of securities by small businesses, conditioned principally on the disclosure of prescribed investment information to all
purchasers a reasonable time before the sale of the securities. The
disclosure and the regulatory obligations of revised Regulation A would be
closely tailored by the Commission to ensure that the small issuer's
compliance expenses do no overwhelm an offering of $250,000. To
facilitate a wide, economical search for investors, the restructured
Regulation A would continue a generous "test the waters" provision, and
it would eliminate unwarranted federal bureaucratic interference by no
longer requiring any Commission review of the offering statement. Finally,
to be effective, these changes must be accompanied by the elimination of
state control over Regulation A offerings.
Operating under such a regime, a small business in search of capital
could freely use the media in its solicitation and essentially would be
limited only by antifraud provisions as it went about the difficult task of
identifying potential investors. A small business could, for example, put
together a one page term sheet and use that to offer its securities through
newspaper, radio, or television advertisements, on the Internet, or directly
to friends or business associates or potential investors it is able to identify
through other means. Three days before any contract for the sale of the
investment, however, the small issuer would have to deliver an offering
circular to investors, a document that would contain information closely
tailored by the Commission to properly balance capital formation with
investor protection.
The result would be an important change in the way small issuers are
able to acquire their external capital. While these revisions of Regulation
A would not cure all disadvantages of small businesses, they would amount
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to a step in the right direction-a step toward eliminating the discriminatory rules that society has placed on the capital formation activities of small
businesses.
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